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891 
“DAMN THE TORPEDOES! FULL SPEED 
AHEAD”:* THE FCC’S DECISION TO 
DEREGULATE MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND 
THE THREAT TO VIEWPOINT DIVERSITY 
Matthew Keller** 
“The beliefs which we have most warrant for have no safeguard to 
rest on but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them 
unfounded.”1 
“Do you know how much ‘Friends’ costs? Can you be a mom-and-
pop operation and pay Jennifer Aniston the $1 million an episode 
that produces that formula?”2 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 2, 2003, the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC or Commission) voted to relax several of its media 
ownership regulations.3 One of the proposed changes would allow, 
                                                          
 * Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 
2002), modified by 293 F.3d 537 (2002). 
 ** Brooklyn Law School Class of 2005; B.S., Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 1997. The author wishes to thank his family for the enormous love 
and support that makes this possible, and especially Lauren, whose love makes it 
all worthwhile. 
1 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 20 (Hackett Publishing Co. 1978) 
(1859). 
2 FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell, on how shows like the popular sitcom 
Friends will be in jeopardy if giant media corporations are not allowed to own 
more television stations. Frank James, FCC Chief Warns of Future Shock, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 07, 2003, at 11. 
3 Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and 
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for the first time since 1975, a single entity to own both a 
newspaper and a television station in the same local market.4 A 
second proposal would greatly increase the number of regional 
markets in which a single owner could own two television stations 
and would allow common ownership of even three stations in large 
markets.5 A third proposed change would allow a single entity to 
own television stations having a combined reach of 45 percent of 
the national television audience.6 
The proposed rule changes generated an outpouring of public 
disapproval.7 One United States senator commented that “the 
FCC’s action was one of the most complete cave-ins to corporate 
interests I’ve ever seen by what is supposed to be a federal 
                                                          
Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets, 
and Definition of Radio Markets, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003) 
[hereinafter The 2003 Order]. 
4 Id. at 46,312. The original newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule 
prohibited “common ownership of a full-service broadcast station and a daily 
newspaper” in the same market. Id. at ¶ 230; 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (2002). The 
2003 Order repealed this rule. Id. at ¶ 247. This change will, according to 
analysts, allow TV-newspaper mergers in approximately 180 local markets, in 
which about 98 percent of the U.S. population lives. COOPER, MARK, MEDIA 
OWNERSHIP AND DEMOCRACY IN THE DIGITAL INFORMATION AGE 192 (2003), 
available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blogs/cooper/archives/mediabooke. pdf 
[hereinafter COOPER]. 
5 Id. at 46,294 ¶ 83. Under the old rules, TV duopolies (ownership of two 
local stations) were allowed in about 60 markets that covered about two-thirds 
of the national population. COOPER, supra note 4, at 192. The new rules would 
allow duopolies and even triopolies in over 160 markets covering 95 percent of 
the U.S. population. Id. 
6 Id. at 46,328 ¶ 352. The previous limit was 35 percent. Id. This proposal 
has since been rejected by Congress and the limit has been set by statute at 39 
percent. See Stephen Labaton, Court Is Urged to Change Media Ownership 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at C14. 
7 The reported number of public comments received by the FCC in 
response to the vote varied widely, but all estimates were large. See Chelie 
Pingree, The Big Media Monopoly, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2003, at A26 
(reporting that the FCC received over 2 million public comments, nearly all 
against relaxing the rules); Anne C. Mulkern, Senate: Overturn FCC Rule On 
Media Vote to Limit Ownership Defies Bush Veto Threat, DENVER POST, 
September 17, 2003, at C-01 (reporting that “most” of the 750,000 comments 
the FCC received opposed the changes). 
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regulatory agency.”8 On September 16, 2003, the United States 
Senate collectively responded to the proposed changes. By a vote 
of 54-40, the Senate added a brief amendment to the appropriations 
bill that would fund the FCC for 2004.9 The amendment read as 
follows: 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That 
Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the Federal 
Communications Commission relating to broadcast media 
ownership . . . and such rule shall have no force or effect.10 
The FCC attempted to support its rule changes on two separate 
grounds. The Commission argued first that the changes were 
legally required by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.11 
Specifically, the FCC found itself constrained by the fact that the 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had interpreted that Act to 
contain a “presumption in favor of repealing or modifying” media 
ownership rules.12 Second, the FCC argued that the current level of 
regulation was no longer required due to changes in the media 
landscape.13 
The rule changes adopted by the FCC on June 2 represent the 
broadest deregulation of media ownership in decades and severely 
limit the government’s ability to provide Americans with “the 
                                                          
8 Demetri Sevastopulof, Senate In Move to Overturn New FCC Rules, 
LONDON FIN. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003, at 2 (quoting Senator Byron Dorgan (D-
ND)). 
9 S. J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003); Stephen Labaton, FCC Plan to Ease 
Curbs on Big Media Hits Senate Snag, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at A1. 
10 S. J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003) (emphasis added). The House of 
Representatives had passed a similar amendment over a month earlier by a vote 
of 400-21. See Christopher Stern & Jonathan Krim, House Votes to Prevent 
Change in Media Rule, WASH. POST, July 24, 2003, at A01. 
11 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 
(1996). 
12 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 
2002), modified by 293 F.3d 537 (2002). 
13 See The 2003 Order, supra note 3, at 46,286 ¶ 52. The Order noted that, 
unlike the broadcast world in which the broadcast rules evolved, the modern 
world is “characterized not by information scarcity, but by media abundance.” 
Id. 
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widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources.”14 Antagonistic and broad-ranging debate 
over questions of public importance has long been considered an 
indispensable element of a self-governing society. This idea has 
had a lively existence apart from American law, and was perhaps 
best expressed by John Stuart Mill in his classic treatise On 
Liberty.15 Although viewpoint diversity was probably not foremost 
in the Framers’ minds in 1776,16 it has come to be considered 
                                                          
14 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (stating that 
“[the First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential 
to the welfare of the public”). 
15 See MILL, supra note 1, chapter II, Of the Liberty of Thought and 
Discussion. Mill discussed at length the historical, philosophical, and moral 
arguments against suppression of dissident ideas in a society. Id. Briefly, his 
argument can be summarized in three parts. First, Mill suggested that, because 
humans are fallible creatures, we can never know with absolute certainty 
whether any of our views are true. Id. at 50. Therefore, “if any opinion is 
compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be 
true.” Id. Second, Mill noted both that “though the silenced opinion be an error, 
it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth,” and that “the 
general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth.” 
Id. From this, he concluded, “it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that 
the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.” Id. Finally, Mill 
argued that, even if the “general or prevailing opinion” is in fact the whole truth, 
it is necessary to frequently reaffirm that truth by testing it against dissident 
viewpoints. Id. Otherwise, Mill suggested, such truths would be held by the 
people “in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its 
rational grounds.” Id. 
16 See Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC 
Ownership Regulations, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 401, 404 (1989). Emord argues that 
the Framers of the Constitution did not envision the First Amendment as a 
protector of viewpoint diversity. Id. The changed circumstances of public 
discourse since 1776, however, may in part explain the Supreme Court’s 
growing concern with protection of a diversity of views. See Owen M. Fiss, 
Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1410-13 (1986) 
[hereinafter Fiss]. Fiss points out that we are no longer living in times where 
everyone has more or less equal access to public fora. Id. As he points out, 
“more is required . . . than a soapbox, a good voice, and the talent to hold an 
audience.” Id. For a general discussion of the Framers’ understanding of the 
First Amendment, see Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First 
Amendment, 80 NW. U.L. REV. 1156 (1986); Alexander Meiklejohn, What Does 
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“central” to the Supreme Court’s First Amendment analysis.17 In 
the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, arguably the 
greatest (at least the most well-known) statement of the importance 
of public debate is Justice Holmes’ famous “marketplace of ideas” 
discussion in Abrams v. United States: “the best test of truth is the 
power of [a] thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market.”18 Beyond Holmes, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
reaffirmed the principle that the First Amendment protects broad 
public debate.19 The policy choices underlying the FCC’s 
deregulation on June 2 sell this First Amendment principle short in 
the pursuit of commercially successful entertainment.20 
This note attempts to provide some context for the FCC’s 
decision to deregulate on June 2 and offers a critique of that 
decision. Part I provides a brief history of media regulation. It 
tracks the emergence of two strands of regulation, one focusing on 
broadcast content and the other on structural regulation of media 
ownership. Fueled in part by emerging law and economics 
                                                          
the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 461 (1953). 
17 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994). 
18 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). Justice 
Brandeis went further along these lines, pointing out not only the value but the 
citizen’s duty of public discussion in noting “that the greatest menace to freedom 
is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should 
be a fundamental principle of the American government.” Whitney, 274 U.S. at 
375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
19 See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 663 (“[A]ssuring that the public has 
access to a multiplicity of information sources is governmental purpose of the 
highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment.”); 
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (stating that “[the First] 
Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of 
the public”). 
20 COOPER, supra note 4, at 21. Cooper points out that the free-market 
model favored by the FCC’s new rules “favors entertainment at the expense of 
information.” Id. While such a model is “splendid” for providing goods and 
services such as entertainment, it fails to produce “the kind of debate that 
constantly renews the capacity of a people for self-determination.” Id. (citing 
Owen M. Fiss, Essays Commemorating the One Hundredth Anniversary of the 
Harvard Law Review: Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987)). 
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scholarship, broadcast regulation began to wane in the late 1970s 
and continued on a downward trend, culminating in the passage of 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.21 Part II discusses the two 
major cases interpreting the section of the 1996 Act dealing with 
media ownership.22 It relates how the FCC took advantage of the 
deregulatory language of those opinions23 by rushing through its 
rulemaking procedures, heedless of both public outcry and a 
judicial modification of its earlier deregulatory language. Part II 
concludes by summarizing the continuing battle in Congress and 
the courts following the June 2 vote. 
In Part III, an analysis is offered which attempts to discredit the 
FCC’s legal justification for its rule changes, and to attack the 
remaining policy justifications as misguided and focused on the 
wrong underlying interests. The analysis proposes that the D.C. 
Court of Appeals decisions in Fox and Sinclair, upon which the 
FCC relied heavily to justify its rule changes, may have given a 
deregulatory gloss to the media ownership portion of the 1996 Act 
that was not intended by Congress.24 The court itself seemed to 
                                                          
21 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 
(1996). 
22 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 
2002), modified by 293 F.3d 537 (2002); Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 
284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
23 See Fox, 280 F.3d at 1044. The title of this note is taken from the 
statement made, in dicta, in the Fox opinion that the deregulatory intent of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 could be likened to “Farragut’s order at the 
battle of Mobile Bay (‘Damn the torpedoes! Full speed ahead.’).” Id. 
24 See Statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell, 2002 Biennial 
Regulatory Review, at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ FCC-
03-127A3.doc (released July 2, 2003) [hereinafter Powell Statement]. The FCC 
Chairman’s statement accompanying the rule changes repeatedly asserts that 
deregulation of the broadcast rules was mandated by the Fox and Sinclair courts. 
Id. In the statement’s introduction, Chairman Powell claimed that “[k]eeping the 
rules exactly as they are, as some so stridently suggest, was not a viable option” 
and that “[w]ithout today’s surgery, the rules would assuredly have met a swift 
death [in the courts.]” Id. at 1. The very next section of the Chairman’s 
statement begins: “Critical to understanding our actions, is an understanding of 
the court’s view of Congress’ charge to the Commission in the 1996 
Telecommunications Act.” Id. (emphasis added). Later, the Chairman claims 
that “[r]ecent court decisions have established a high hurdle for the Commission 
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recognize this, later modifying the Fox decision by removing some 
of that opinion’s deregulatory language.25 The Fox and Sinclair 
opinions taken as a whole do not support the FCC’s conclusion 
that those opinions required the comprehensive deregulation 
promulgated by the Commission on June 2, 2003. Part III thus 
concludes that the FCC’s insistence that these opinions mandated 
further deregulation was unjustified. The opinions left the FCC 
with the broad discretion it has historically held to promulgate 
rules in the public interest. Therefore, the decision to further 
release the ownership of broadcast television stations to market 
forces was the FCC’s alone. The analysis concludes that this 
decision unwisely risks substantial damage to the public discourse 
that is one of the essential foundations of our democracy. If the 
FCC’s new rules are allowed to take effect, the resulting 
concentration of communicative power into a handful of giant for-
profit media corporations will further weaken this foundation. 
I.   A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEDIA REGULATION 
A scheme of government regulation of electronic broadcasting 
was originally established in the early 20th century to solve the 
novel technical problems raised by the new medium of radio.26 
State exertion of this power to guide the medium, however, soon 
began to take on political undertones. Rules soon appeared that 
dealt not with technical matters, but with both the structure of the 
marketplace of broadcasters and with the content of broadcasts.27 
                                                          
to maintain a given broadcast ownership regulation.” Id. at 2. 
25 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
26 See National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-13 
(discussing early efforts by government to deal with the new technical problems 
posed by radio technology). 
27 See id. at 216-17. The NBC case dealt with a broadcaster’s challenge to 
“chain broadcasting” rules, discussed more fully in Part I.C, infra. Although the 
chain broadcasting rules could not be justified on technical grounds alone the 
Court nevertheless found them to be valid under Federal law, holding that the 
FCC’s “licensing function cannot be discharged . . . merely by finding that there 
are no technological objections to the granting of a license.” Id. at 216. The 
Court made the observation that, if limited to technical considerations, “how 
could the Commission choose between two applicants for the same facilities, 
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Both types of rules remained in effect until the early 1980s, after 
which a new administration with broad deregulatory proclivities 
began to dismantle the old regulatory regime.28 Content 
regulations, which had raised First Amendment concerns from the 
beginning, were the first to go.29 Structural ownership regulations 
remained, but were the subject of a rising level of scrutiny by those 
who favored greater marketplace control of the television and radio 
station market.30 Deregulation continued into the nineties, 
culminating in the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996.31 The 1996 Act revised national telecommunications policy 
by encouraging greater competition and private investment in new 
technology through deregulation.32 The 1996 Act also included 
further deregulation of broadcast ownership, causing some to 
question the wisdom of market control of the core democratic 
function of dissemination of public information.33 
                                                          
each of whom is financially and technically qualified to operate a station?” Id. at 
216-17. See infra Part I.B for further discussion of this point. 
28 See PATRICIA AUFERHIDE, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, 26 (1999) (“The election 
of Ronald Reagan in 1980 was a watershed for deregulatory action.”); see infra 
Part I.E (discussing the influence of Law and Economics on the Reagan 
administration and telecommunications policy in particular in the 1980s). 
29 See, e.g., In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules 
and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of 
Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145 (1985) (repudiating the fairness 
doctrine, which required stations to broadcast competing viewpoints of public 
issues). See infra Part I.D for further discussion of the fairness doctrine and 
other content-based regulations. 
30 See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to 
Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1982). Fowler, a former FCC 
Commissioner, was an ardent and influential advocate for market control of 
broadcasting. Id. See infra Part I.E for further discussion of this point. 
31 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 
(1996). 
32 Id. The stated purpose of the Act was to “promote competition and 
reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for 
American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment 
of new telecommunications technologies.” Id. 
33 See infra Part II.B.4 (discussing adverse public, Congressional, and 
judicial reactions to broadcast deregulation). 
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A.  Original Justifications for Regulation 
The initial motive for government regulation of radio was 
predominantly technical in nature; laws were needed to prevent the 
interference between, and resulting incoherence of, radio 
broadcasts transmitted on the same frequency.34 Therefore, while 
newspaper publication has always been largely left to private 
competition in the market, from the very beginning the broadcast 
media evolved under what has been called a “trusteeship” model.35 
As large numbers of broadcasters began to use radio commercially, 
the increasing competition for the limited space on the airwaves 
resulted in chaos.36 After appeals to broadcasters to regulate 
themselves to avoid interference went unheeded, several 
government officials, including then-President Calvin Coolidge, 
called upon Congress to solve the problem with appropriate 
legislation.37 
B.  Technical Regulation Yields to Political Regulation 
Congress established the nation’s first comprehensive 
regulatory scheme for broadcasting with the Radio Act of 1927.38 
The Radio Act established the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) 
                                                          
34 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969) (“Without 
government control, the medium would be of little use because of the cacophony 
of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably heard.”). 
35 Fowler & Brenner, supra note 30, at 216-17 (1982). “Governmental 
guidance in broadcast decision-making, the fundamental characteristic of the 
trusteeship model, sets it apart from a marketplace approach.” Id. 
36 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375. 
37 See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943). In a message to 
Congress delivered on December 7, 1926, President Coolidge warned that “the 
whole service of this most important public function has drifted into such chaos 
as seems likely, if not remedied, to destroy its great value.” Id. Some writers 
have suggested that, unlike the press, early government regulation of radio was 
also tolerated because the technology was first used for military, safety, and 
rescue purposes, traditional areas of legitimate state control. See BRUCE M. 
OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA STRUCTURE AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 88 (1975); Fowler & Brenner, supra note 30, at 213. 
38 The Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1163 (1927). 
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and delegated to that body the responsibility of licensing 
broadcasters.39 Licensing under the Radio Act sought to avoid 
interference,40 and initially FRC regulation centered on this issue.41 
Because licenses were issued to broadcasters by the FRC free of 
charge, however, the resulting demand for licenses quickly grew 
larger than the available radio frequency spectrum could 
accommodate.42 The Commission needed some way of 
determining who would receive the limited number of licenses and 
for how long they would hold them.43 The standard provided in the 
Radio Act of 1927 to guide the Commission in these decisions was 
“as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.”44 This 
short, vague phrase added a discretionary political component to 
broadcast regulation that would later become the source of great 
power for the Commission.45 
                                                          
39 See The Radio Act of 1927, § 3 (establishing the Commission); § 4 
(establishing criteria for issuing licences). 
40 The Radio Act of 1927, § 4(f). “Interference” is defined by the FCC as 
“[t]he effect of unwanted energy due to one or a combination of emissions, 
radiations, or inductions upon reception in a radiocommunication system, 
manifested by any performance degradation, misinterpretation, or loss of 
information which could be extracted in the absence of such unwanted energy.” 
47 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2004). 
41 OWEN, supra note 37, at 89 (“Initial concern was centered on technical 
questions of interference.”). 
42 Id. 
43 Id.; The Radio Act of 1927 also established license application and 
renewal procedures. Licensees were required to renew their station licenses with 
the FRC periodically. See The Radio Act of 1927, §§ 9-14. 
44 The Radio Act of 1927, § 4. 
45 See Benjamin M. Compaine, The Impact of Ownership on Content: Does 
it Matter?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L. J. 755, 758 (1995). “By far the most 
powerful six words in the history of [broadcast] regulation must be ‘the public 
interest, convenience, and necessity.’” Id.; FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 
U.S. 134, 138 (1940) (referring to the public-interest standard of the Radio and 
Communications Acts as “a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by 
the expert body which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy”); 
JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW 
SYSTEM 263 (5th ed. 2003) (“The authorization to the FCC to grant broadcast 
licenses based on a showing of ‘public interest, convenience, and necessity’ 
obviously leaves the agency a lot of room for deciding what these terms 
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Seven years later, the foregoing provisions of the Radio Act of 
1927 were incorporated into the Communications Act of 1934.46 
The Communications Act of 1934 expanded the role of the FRC to 
include regulation of communication by wire and, as a result, the 
name of the Commission was changed to the Federal 
Communications Commission.47 The Communications Act of 1934 
did not, however, alter the “public interest” standard under which 
the FCC was to issue broadcast licenses.48 
C.  Structural Regulation in the Public Interest 
The history of the broadcast regulations promulgated by the 
FRC (and later the FCC) pursuant to authority granted by the 
Radio and Communications Acts can be separated into two 
categories: structural rules and behavioral rules.49 Structural rules 
define “who may own outlets and how many they may own.”50 The 
FCC has historically justified its structural rules on the grounds 
that diverse ownership of broadcast stations promotes viewpoint 
diversity.51 The Supreme Court in FCC v. National Citizens 
Committee for Broadcasting agreed that this justification was a 
                                                          
mean.”). 
46 The Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934). 
47 The Communications Act of 1934, § 4. 
48 See The Communications Act of 1934, §§ 307, 309 (ordering the FCC to 
grant and renew broadcast licenses to applicants “if public convenience, interest, 
or necessity will be served thereby”). 
49 See Daniel L. Brenner, Ownership and Content Regulation in Merging 
and Emerging Media, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1996). Brenner’s 
classification of media regulations into “structural” and “behavioral” categories 
is utilized throughout this note. 
50 Id. at 1015. 
51 See Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of Commission’s 
Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television 
Broadcast Stations, Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1050 (1975). 
“The significance of ownership from the standpoint of ‘the widest possible 
dissemination of information’ lies in the fact that ownership carries with it the 
power to select, to edit, and to choose the methods, manner and emphasis of 
presentation, all of which are a critical aspect of the Commission’s concern with 
the public interest.” Id. 
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reasonable interpretation of the “public interest” standard.52 
One example of a long-standing structural rule is a national 
ownership limitation. From almost the beginning of broadcast 
regulation in this country, the FCC has, in one form or another, 
limited the total number of stations a broadcaster may own 
nationwide.53 At the time it was originally promulgated, the stated 
purpose of the national ownership restriction “was twofold: (1) to 
encourage diversity of ownership in order to foster the expression 
of varied viewpoints and programming, and (2) to safeguard 
against undue concentration of economic power.”54 
Other structural regulations have limited media ownership on a 
local level, either by prohibiting cross-ownership (defined as 
common ownership of either a radio station or a newspaper and a 
television station in the same community),55 or by limiting the 
number of commonly-owned television stations in a local market.56 
So-called “chain broadcasting” regulations at one point went past 
limiting common ownership to prohibiting the ability of 
independent broadcasters to contract with one another in ways 
                                                          
52 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978). Indeed, the NCCB court made it clear that 
First Amendment concerns were an important consideration in the FCC’s 
interpretation of the public interest standard. “The ‘public interest’ standard,” 
the court noted, “necessarily invites reference to First Amendment principles.” 
Id. The Court further held that an individual’s right to speak does not trump the 
collective right of all Americans to speak. “[T]here is no unabridgeable First 
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to 
speak, write, or publish.” Id. at 799 (internal citations omitted). 
53 See C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up On Democracy, 
54 FLA. L. REV. 839, 865 (2002) [hereinafter Baker]. “Regulation began in the 
1940s, when the FCC explicitly limited [nationwide] ownership to six FM radio 
stations and three television stations.” Id.; see also In the Matter of Amendment 
of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and 
Television Broadcast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984) (giving a history of the 
national ownership restrictions) [hereinafter The 1984 Order]. 
54 The 1984 Order, 100 F.C.C.2d at 17 ¶ 3. 
55 See, e.g., Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and 
Television Broadcast Stations, Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 
(1975). 
56 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (1998). The name of the original local station 
ownership rule was the “duopoly rule.” 
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which limited their freedom to broadcast diverse programming.57 
Several of these structural rules have been challenged by 
licensees seeking to increase ownership. Those challenges that 
have reached the Supreme Court have been denied.58 In 1943, the 
Court upheld chain broadcasting regulations in NBC v. United 
States.59 The NBC decision construed the Communications Act as 
providing the FCC broad authority to regulate licensees in pursuit 
of the public interest.60 The Court also explicitly held that the 
exercise of such authority to regulate broadcasters was not a First 
Amendment violation.61 
In FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 
several broadcasting and newspaper associations challenged the 
FCC’s cross-ownership ban.62 The Supreme Court rejected the 
challenge, reaffirming the broad authority of the FCC to regulate in 
                                                          
57 See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 198-210 (1943) (summarizing 
eight of the FCC’s “chain broadcasting” rules). “Chain broadcasting,” defined in 
the Communications Act as “the simultaneous broadcasting of an identical 
program by two or more connected stations,” became the subject of regulation 
after FCC studies revealed the extent to which the national networks (NBC, 
CBS, and Mutual) had used the practice to dominate the radio market. Id. at 198 
(citing FCC studies that showed, inter alia, that “NBC and CBS together 
controlled more than 85% of the total night-time wattage, and [that] the 
broadcast business of the three national network companies amounted to almost 
half of the total business of all stations in the United States”). The FCC, while 
recognizing that chain broadcasting provided “benefits and advantages to both 
the listening public and to broadcast station licensees,” also asserted its 
responsibility “to see that practices which adversely affect the ability of 
licensees to operate in the public interest are eliminated.” Id. 
58 See, e.g., FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978); 
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
59 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
60 Id. at 219. “In the context of the developing problems to which it was 
directed, the [Communications] Act gave the Commission not niggardly but 
expansive powers.” Id. 
61 Id. at 227. “The standard [of the Communications Act] provided for the 
licensing of stations was the ‘public interest, convenience, or necessity.’ Denial 
of a station license on that ground, if valid under the [Communications] Act, is 
not a denial of free speech.” Id. 
62 FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978). 
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the public interest recognized in NBC and other cases.63 In 
National Citizens Committee, one of the challenges made to the 
rule was that the prohibition of cross-ownership was unreasonable 
because the FCC had not sufficiently established that the rule 
contributed to an increased diversity of broadcast viewpoints.64 
The Court held that the FCC had acted rationally, notwithstanding 
the inconclusiveness of the rulemaking record, because “[d]iversity 
and its effects are . . . elusive concepts, not easily defined let alone 
measured without making qualitative judgments objectionable on 
both policy and First Amendment grounds.”65 The Court, quoting 
the FCC’s own rationale for believing that diverse ownership was a 
rational proxy for diversity of viewpoints, upheld and seconded the 
FCC’s judgment that structural regulations were necessary to 
maintain truly diverse viewpoints.66 
D.  Behavioral Regulation in the Public Interest 
As distinguished from structural regulations, behavioral media 
regulations have been defined as “controlling what’s 
communicated”67 and necessarily involve direct government 
regulation of broadcast content.68 Early attempts by the FRC (and 
later the FCC) to issue licenses pursuant to the “public 
convenience, interest, or necessity” standard occasionally required 
the Commission to make licensing decisions based on program 
content. For example, in KFKB v. Federal Radio Commission, a 
broadcaster appealed an FRC decision denying renewal of his 
                                                          
63 Id. at 793-94. 
64 Id. at 796. 
65 Id. at 796-97. 
66 See NCCB, 436 U.S. at 785, 797. “In these circumstances, the 
Commission was entitled to rely on its judgment, based on experience, that ‘it is 
unrealistic to expect true diversity from a commonly owned station-newspaper 
combination. The divergency of their viewpoints cannot be expected to be the 
same as if they were antagonistically run.’” Id. at 797 (internal citations 
omitted). 
67 Brenner, supra note 30, at 1013. 
68 Id. at 1014; see also Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 
77 HARV. L. REV. 701 (1964). 
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license on content-based grounds.69 Specifically, the denial was 
based on a finding that the content of the broadcaster’s programs 
was “inimical to the public health and safety, and for that reason 
was not in the public interest.”70 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
found on review that denial of license renewal on this basis was 
not rightly considered censorship, and was a valid execution of the 
Commission’s statutorily-defined mandate to allocate licenses in 
the public interest.71 
Behavioral regulation also provided the foundation for the 
“fairness doctrine,” which for decades required licensed 
broadcasters to allow voices on all sides of important public issues 
to be heard.72 The fairness doctrine evolved from two interrelated 
strands of prior FRC and FCC “public interest” regulation: first, 
the requirement that broadcasters give adequate coverage to public 
issues73, and second, that coverage on such issues be “fair” in the 
sense that it accurately reflect opposing views.74 
                                                          
69 KFKB v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 47 F.2d 670, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1931). 
70 Id. KFKB involved an entrepreneurial physician who hosted a radio show 
in which listeners would inform the doctor of their ailments and ask for a 
diagnosis and suggested treatment. Id. As one might expect, the recommended 
remedy for the vast majority of these ailments was one of the doctor’s own 
preparations. Id. Looking with disfavor upon this practice, the FRC declined the 
doctor’s application for renewal of his license, stating that, “[w]hile it is to be 
expected that a licensee of a radio broadcasting station will receive some 
remuneration for serving the public with radio programs, at the same time the 
interest of the listening public is paramount, and may not be subordinated to the 
interests of the station licensee.” Id. 
71 Id. at 673 (“In considering the question whether the public interest, 
convenience, or necessity will be served by a renewal of appellant’s license, the 
commission has merely exercised its undoubted right to take note of appellant’s 
past conduct, which is not censorship.”). 
72 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969) (discussing 
the origin and history of the fairness doctrine); see also Great Lakes Broad. Co., 
3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929) (stating the FRC’s view that “the public 
interest requires ample play for the free and fair competition of opposing views, 
and the commission believes that the principle applies . . . to all discussions of 
issues of importance to the public”). 
73 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 377 (citing United Broad. Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 
(1945)). 
74 See id. (citing New Broad. Co., 6 P & F Radio Reg. 258 (1950)). In 1985, 
KELLERMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  1:20 PM 
906 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
For years, the FCC used its power to award and deny licenses 
under the fairness doctrine as a way of shaping program content.75 
In 1946 the FCC issued a “Blue Book” outlining the Commission’s 
programming policy, recognizing the need for “broadcasters to air 
programs of community interest.”76 The Blue Book stated that the 
FCC would give “particular consideration” to four types of content 
programming behaviors: (1) programs unsupported by advertising; 
(2) local live programs; (3) public issues discussions; and (4) 
efforts to limit hourly advertising.77 In 1960, the FCC issued a 
Program Policy Statement that also defined several types of 
preferred programming content.78 
In 1967, the FCC promulgated rules requiring a station to offer 
free air time to political candidates and private citizens, affording 
both the opportunity to respond to campaign messages or personal 
attacks broadcast on that station.79 As opposed to the general 
principles of the fairness doctrine, the 1967 rules specifically 
required broadcasters to involuntarily cede their broadcast facilities 
                                                          
the FCC described the fairness doctrine as requiring broadcast license holders 
“[(1)] to provide coverage of vitally important controversial issues of interest in 
the community served by the licensees, [and (2)] to provide a reasonable 
opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints on such issues.” 
Report Concerning General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast 
Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 146 (1985). 
75 See Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HARV. L. REV. 
701 (1964). 
76 See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 30, at 215; Brenner, supra note 49, at 
1013 n.27. 
77 Fowler & Brenner, supra note 30, at 215. 
78 See En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960); Fowler & 
Brenner, supra note 30, at 216. The statement mentioned the following as 
integral to the public interest: opportunity for local self-expression, development 
and use of local talent, children programming, religious programming, 
educational programming, public affairs programming, editorialization by 
licensees, political broadcasts, agricultural programming, news programming, 
weather and market services, sports programming, service to minority groups. 
Fowler & Brenner, supra note 30, n.44; see also Brenner, supra note 49, at 1013 
(describing the practical application of the statement as “obligat[ing] a 
broadcaster to develop a diversity rich program environment—if the broadcaster 
expected to have its license easily renewed”). 
79 33 Fed. Reg. 5362 (1967). 
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to others in certain situations.80 Consequently, broadcasters 
challenged the rules as unconstitutional abridgements of the 
freedoms of speech and press.81 In one of the ensuing lawsuits, the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit struck down the FCC 
rules as violations of the broadcasters’ First Amendment rights.82 
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Supreme Court 
reversed the Seventh Circuit’s decision and upheld the FCC 
rules.83 The Court held that the personal attack and political 
editorializing rules were merely more precise reiterations of the 
fairness doctrine.84 As such, the rules were valid to the same extent 
as the doctrine itself.85 The Court also reiterated the argument 
made in NBC that, because radio spectrum was limited, 
government regulation of the speech broadcast thereon was 
proper.86 Therefore, given the limited spectrum of frequencies, the 
Court found that content-based rules requiring individual licensees 
to air viewpoints that they did not hold were constitutional.87 This 
                                                          
80 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 378 (“[The 1967 rules] differ from the general 
fairness requirement that issues be presented, and presented with coverage of 
competing views, in that the broadcaster does not have the option of presenting 
the attacked party’s side himself or choosing a third party to represent that 
side.”). 
81 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (1967). 
82 See Radio Television News Directors Ass’n v. U.S., 400 F.2d 1002, 1020 
(7th Cir. 1968) (“In view of the vagueness of the Commission’s rules, the 
burden they impose on licensees, and the possibility they raise of both 
Commission censorship and licensee self-censorship, we conclude that the 
personal attack and political editorial rules would contravene the First 
Amendment.”). 
83 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375. 
84 Id. 
85 See id. (“Believing that the specific application of the fairness doctrine in 
Red Lion, and the promulgation of the [rules at issue] are both authorized by 
Congress and enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of speech and press 
protected by the First Amendment, we hold them valid and constitutional.”). 
86 NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1948). “Unlike other modes of 
expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique 
characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to 
governmental regulation.” Id. 
87 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (“Because of the scarcity of radio 
frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor 
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view, which came to be known as the “scarcity doctrine,” became 
the primary justification given for government regulation of 
broadcast content.88 
E.  Enter Law and Economics 89 
Law and economics scholarship has applied economic 
principles to media regulation.90 The law and economics 
movement, grounded in ideas of personal freedom as a route to 
                                                          
of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium.”). 
88 Fowler & Brenner, supra note 30, at 221 (“Spectrum scarcity always has 
been the cornerstone of the justification for . . . reducing First Amendment 
protection for broadcasters.”). 
89 See Charles K. Rowley, Public Choice and the Economic Analysis of 
Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 125 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989). “Law and 
economics” can be defined as “the application of economic theory and 
econometric methods to examine the formation, structure, processes and impact 
of law and legal institutions.” Id. Starting in the 1970s, law and economics 
scholars began disseminating articles on a wide variety of legal issues. See 
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 438 (1995) (“The years since 1970 
have witnessed an expanding torrent of scholarly writing across the full range of 
law and economics.”). By the end of the 1980s, the effects of this scholarship 
were palpable in a wide array of practice areas. See William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study, 
36 J. LAW & ECON. 385, 386 (1993) (noting the many areas of law in which 
economic influences are “strong”); see also William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust 
Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust 
Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413 (1990); Brenner, supra note 49, at 1019 n.66. 
90 See OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA 
STRUCTURE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1975). The law and economics 
perspective sometimes cuts against the grain of prevailing legal rules. Mr. 
Owen, an economist by vocation, apologizes in his foreword for not giving the 
“full sympathy to the weight of precedent and to the limits of judicial 
legislation” that a lawyer normally would. Id. at xix. Unfortunately, the practice 
of not giving due weight to precedent is not always limited to non-lawyers. 
Some prominent law and economics-minded jurists have been accused of the 
same fault. See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 57 (2001) 
(discussing an amici curiae brief filed by twenty-one state attorneys general 
asking the Supreme Court to review a Seventh Circuit antitrust decision and 
arguing that the circuit, in cases decided by Judges Richard Posner and Frank 
Easterbrook, was ignoring Supreme Court precedent in order to find in favor of 
defendant businesses). 
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maximized social utility, ideally favors no government regulation 
of broadcasters at all.91 If any regulation must be tolerated, 
structural rules are preferred to content-based regulations.92 
In 1982 FCC Chairman Mark Fowler published an article 
calling for total deregulation of the broadcast media in favor of 
market control.93 Fowler believed that the marketplace was a more 
reliable arena than the FCC for discovering the public interest.94 
Fowler’s calls for complete deregulation were not successful, but 
the FCC clearly began to focus on the “public interest” from an 
economic efficiency perspective.95 Reflecting this ideological shift, 
FCC analyses of media mergers began to take on the tone of 
antitrust proceedings, focusing more on preventing harmful 
economic consolidation in broadcasting and less on dictating 
content.96 This was a marked break from its earlier, more 
                                                          
91 See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1849, 1861 n.48 (1987). Radin points out the similarities between modern day 
law-and-economics scholars and classical utilitarians. Id. 
92 See OWEN, supra note 90, at xix (noting the difference between the 
traditional legislative and judicial tendency to “remedy inequities by imposing 
behavioral sanctions and constraints on the process by which decisions are 
reached” and the economist’s focus on “seek[ing] an organizational structure 
that will provide internal incentives to decentralized decision makers, which will 
lead to actions having some desirable attributes such as efficiency and fairness.” 
(emphasis added). 
93 Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to 
Broadcast Regulation, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 207 (1982). Chairman Fowler argued for 
the removal of public interest obligations from broadcasters. Id. at 209 (“Our 
thesis is that the perception of broadcasters as community trustees should be 
replaced by a view of broadcasters as marketplace participants.”). 
94 Id. at 209-10 (“Instead of defining public demand and specifying 
categories of programming to serve this demand, the Commission should rely on 
the broadcasters’ ability to determine the wants of their audiences through the 
normal mechanisms of the marketplace.”). 
95 See PATRICIA AUFERHIDE, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 27 (1999) (describing FCC 
actions in the early 1980s as “mov[ing] aggressively from a social equity to an 
economic efficiency objective”). 
96 See Baker, supra note 53, at 856 (“The presently dominant approach to 
[broadcast] mergers . . . seems to be a Chicago School interpretation that focuses 
almost exclusively on economic, primarily efficiency, concerns.”). As opposed 
to merger analysis from a “marketplace of ideas” perspective, antitrust analysis 
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qualitative “political” analyses.97 The increasing dominance of 
structural analysis was highlighted when, in 1985, the FCC 
officially repudiated the fairness doctrine.98 The FCC justified its 
abandonment of the fairness doctrine on the grounds that scarcity 
was no longer a problem in mass communications.99 Although it 
took another fifteen years, the 1967 rules requiring free response 
time to personal attacks and political editorials, upheld in Red 
Lion, were judicially vacated in 2000.100 
In combination with the retreat from behavioral regulation and 
the increasing dominance of structural regulation, there was also a 
general relaxation of antitrust scrutiny in all industries throughout 
the 1980s under the Reagan administration.101 The overall result of 
these changes was that the public interest in broadcasting was 
increasingly placed into the “invisible hand” of the market.102 
                                                          
is based on the “dominant, arguably exclusive, aim ‘that mergers should not be 
permitted to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise’ in order 
to prevent ‘a transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers or a misallocation of 
resources.’” Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 
Guidelines). 
97 See Brenner, supra note 49, at 1018 (“[S]ince the 1970s, there’s been a 
marked shift away from analysis that includes political considerations.”). It 
seems clear that the term “political” in this context means “non-economic.” 
98 In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules and 
Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast 
Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 147 (1985) (“[W]e no longer believe that the 
fairness doctrine, as a matter of policy, serves the public interest.”). 
99 Id. at 197. “[W]e have witnessed explosive growth in various 
communications technologies. We find the information marketplace of today . . . 
provides the public with suitable access to the marketplace of ideas so as to 
render the fairness doctrine unnecessary.” Id. 
100 See Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269, 272 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (directing the FCC to immediately repeal the personal attack 
and political editorial rules). 
101 See Brenner, supra note 49, at 1020 (“The general view of antitrust 
enforcement during the Reagan years was to relax the merger and acquisition 
standards for all industries, including media.”); see also AUFERHIDE, supra note 
95, at 26 (“The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 was a watershed for 
deregulatory action.”). 
102 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS, Book IV Chapter II, Of Restraints upon the Importation 
from Foreign Countries of Such Goods as Can Be Produced at Home (1776). 
KELLERMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  1:20 PM 
 FCC DEREGULATION OF MEDIA OWNERSHIP 911 
F.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
The deregulatory movement in mass media regulation 
continued into the 1990s, highlighted by Congress’ passage of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.103 This Act took a deregulatory 
approach to all facets of federal communications policy.104 
Specifically, in terms of television ownership regulations, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 immediately relaxed several of 
the FCC rules then in effect. First, the Act eliminated the 
nationwide limit on station ownership and raised the national 
audience reach cap from 25 to 35 percent.105 The Act also allowed 
for greater affiliation between independent stations and television 
networks.106 Finally, the Act eliminated an FCC prohibition on 
cross-ownership of a broadcast network and a cable system.107 
In addition to these immediate changes, section 202(h) of the 
Act ordered the FCC to conduct reviews of all ownership rules 
every two years to “determine whether any of such rules are 
necessary in the public interest as the result of competition.”108 
Section 202(h) ordered the Commission to “repeal or modify any 
regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest.”109 
                                                          
Smith is credited with the idea that the public interest may best be served by a 
government policy of laissez-faire. Smith hypothesized that an “invisible hand” 
would cause private individuals’ self-interested efforts to also benefit society. Id. 
(“He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by 
an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention . . . . By 
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more 
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.”). 
103 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
104 Id. The first line of the massive Act describes itself as “An Act To 
promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and 
higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and 
encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.” Id. 
105 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(c)(1). 
106 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(e). 
107 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(f)(1). 
108 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h). 
109 Id. The full text of § 202(h) stated: 
The Commission shall review its rules adopted pursuant to this section 
and all of its ownership rules biennially as part of its regulatory reform 
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II.   THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 
1996 
In 1998, after the first “biennial” review conducted pursuant to 
section 202(h) of the 1996 Act, the FCC decided to substantially 
maintain three of its rules: the National Television Station 
Ownership (“NTSO”) rule,110 the Cable/Broadcast Cross 
Ownership (“CBCO”) rule,111 and the Local Ownership Order 
(“LOO”).112 In response, some of the nation’s largest TV 
broadcasters challenged these rules on the ground that the 1996 
Act required them to be repealed. 
A.  Big Media113 Takes Advantage of the Act—The Fox and 
                                                          
review under § 11 of the Communications Act of 1934 and shall 
determine whether any of such rules are necessary in the public interest 
as the result of competition. The Commission shall repeal or modify 
any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest. 
Id. 
110 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) (2004). As described in Fox Television Stations, 
Inc. v. FCC, “[t]he NTSO rule prohibits any entity from controlling television 
stations the combined potential audience reach of which exceeds 35% of the 
television households in the United States.” Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. 
FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2002), modified by 293 F.3d 537 (2002). 
111 47 C.F.R. § 76.501(a) (2004). “The CBCO rule prohibits a cable 
television system from carrying the signal of any television broadcast station if 
the system owns a broadcast station in the same local market.” Fox, 280 F.3d at 
1035 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
112 64 Fed. Reg. 50,651 (Sept. 17, 1999). The Local Ownership Order 
relaxed the constraints of the “duopoly” rule, a long-standing FCC prohibition 
on common ownership of more than one television station in a local market. 
Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 152-55 (2002). Under the 
Order, common ownership of local television stations was permitted, provided 
that two conditions were met: (1) “one of the stations is not among the four 
highest-ranked stations in the market,” and (2) “eight independently owned, full-
power and operational television stations (commercial and noncommercial) will 
remain post-merger.” Id. at 155. 
113 It is helpful at this point to briefly mention the fact that American 
broadcasting is dominated by five corporations: News Corporation (owner of 
Fox Network, 34 TV stations nationwide and other assorted media businesses), 
General Electric (owner of NBC, Telemundo, and Paxson networks, 14 TV 
stations, cable and other businsses), Disney (owner of ABC network, 10 TV 
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Sinclair Cases 
Several major broadcasters, dissatisfied by the FCC’s decision 
to maintain the NTSO, CBCO, and LOO, challenged the rules in 
court.114 The objections to the NTSO and CBCO rules were 
consolidated in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC.115 The 
challenge to the LOO was disposed of in Sinclair Broadcast 
Group, Inc. v. FCC.116 The Fox decision concluded that the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 created a presumption of 
invalidity of FCC rules, thereby imposing on the FCC a greater 
burden of justification for keeping the rules in place.117 The FCC 
used Fox and Sinclair as primary support for its broad deregulatory 
vote on June 2, 2003.118 As the following analysis will show, 
however, these opinions were not as opposed to the legitimacy of 
broadcast regulation as the FCC later contended. 
                                                          
stations, 64 radio stations, and other assorted businesses), Viacom (owner of 
CBS and UPN networks, 39 TV stations, 176 radio stations, cable (MTV), book 
publishing and other media businesses), and Time Warner (owner of the WB 
network, large holdings in book publishing, cable, movie and TV production and 
distribution, music, and internet (AOL) businesses). See Columbia Journalism 
Review, “Who Own’s What” at http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/ (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2004) (listing major media owners and their holdings). 
114 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 
2002), modified by 293 F.3d 537 (2002); Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 
284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The Fox decision discussed infra was actually a 
response to five consolidated petitions by national networks. Fox, 280 F.3d at 
1033. In addition to Fox Television Stations, Inc., the other four petitioners were 
National Broadcasting Company, Inc., CBS Broadcasting, Inc. (and parent 
company Viacom), and Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P. Id. The 
petitioner in Sinclair, while not one of the “Big Five” itself, is a broadcast 
network affiliated with a large number of stations owned by the major networks. 
See infra note 229 (relating Sinclair’s television holdings). 
115 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
116 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
117 Fox, 280 F.3d at 1048. The Sinclair opinion, handed down less than two 
months later, followed this holding. Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 152. 
118 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Fox decision 
In Fox, several major U.S. broadcasters sued the FCC for 
failing to revise the NTSO and CBCO rules during its first biennial 
review pursuant to section 202(h) of the 1996 Act.119 Fox claimed 
that the FCC’s decision not to repeal the rules during its 1998 
review was “arbitrary and capricious” and violated Congress’ 
mandate in section 202(h) of the 1996 Act.120 Fox also contended 
that the NTSO rule violated the First Amendment.121 
The FCC defended the rules under the 1996 Act as being 
necessary in the public interest, dividing its arguments into three 
categories: “competition,” “diversity,” and “localism.”122 Fox’s 
first argument in response was that, since section 202(h) of the 
1996 Act only mentioned “competition,” the FCC was unable to 
regulate “in the name of diversity alone.”123 The court disagreed, 
holding that “nothing in section 202(h) signals a departure from 
[the] historic scope [of diversity in broadcast regulation].”124 
Nevertheless, the Chief Judge for the D.C. Circuit, writing for 
the majority, agreed with Fox that the decision to maintain the 
                                                          
119 Fox, 280 F.3d at 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2002). More precisely, the petitioners 
challenged the FCC rules as a violation of both the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., and The Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
Id. at 1033-34. Since the focus of this note is on telecommunications law and 
policy under The Telecommunications Act of 1996, discussion of the 
administrative law issues posed by the case will not be discussed. 
120 Fox, 280 F.3d at 1040, 1049. 
121 Id. at 1033. 
122 Id. at 1041. This definition of the “public interest” as being composed of 
“diversity” and “competition” interests is consistent with the FCC’s 1984 Order. 
See supra note 54 and accompanying text. The Fox court apparently looked at 
“localism” justifications as a subset of “diversity.” See id. at 1042 (“In the 
context of the regulation of broadcasting, ‘the public interest’ has historically 
embraced diversity (as well as localism) . . . .”) (citing FCC v. Nat. Citizens 
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978)). The remaining discussion of the 
Fox and Sinclair cases will use the D.C. Court of Appeals convention of not 
distinguishing between diversity and localism interests. 
123 Fox, 280 F.3d at 1042. 
124 Id. 
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rules was unjustified in light of section 202(h).125 Regarding the 
NTSO rule, the court found that the FCC had not sufficiently 
justified the rule as necessary to further competition.126 The FCC’s 
diversity-based justification that the rule was necessary to maintain 
the bargaining power of local affiliates with large networks was 
also rejected because it did not have “sufficient support in the 
present record.”127 Finally, the FCC’s argument that the rule 
should be maintained so that the effects of other recent 
deregulatory changes could be independently studied was rejected 
as being inappropriate in light of the 1996 Act.128 The court held 
that the decision to retain the NTSO rule was arbitrary and 
capricious.129 Even though the court decided it had the power to 
vacate the rule rather than remand, it decided to remand to the FCC 
for further consideration.130 
Fox’s First Amendment challenge to the NTSO rule was based 
primarily on the argument that “in today’s populous media 
marketplace the ‘scarcity’ rationale . . . ‘makes no sense’ as a 
reason for regulating ownership.”131 This argument was rejected on 
the grounds that the Supreme Court’s decisions in NBC and NCCB 
were still good law and that, therefore, minimal judicial scrutiny 
was the proper standard of review.132 The court found that the 
NTSO rule survived minimal scrutiny, reaffirming the 
constitutional foundation of the FCC’s traditional commitment to 
viewpoint diversity.133 
                                                          
125 Id. at 1045 (holding that “the decision to retain the NTSO Rule was . . . 
contrary to § 202(h) of the 1996 Act.”); Id. at 1049 (holding that “the retention 
[of the CBCO] was . . . contrary to § 202(h)”). 
126 Id. at 1042. 
127 Id. at 1043. 
128 Id. at 1042. “The Commission’s wait-and-see approach cannot be 
squared with its statutory mandate promptly—that is, by revisiting the matter 
biennially—to ‘repeal or modify’ any rule that is not ‘necessary in the public 
interest.’” Id. (citing § 202(h) of The Telecommunications Act of 1996). 
129 Fox, 280 F.3d at 1044. 
130 Id. at 1048-49. 
131 Id. at 1045. 
132 Id. at 1046. 
133 Id. at 1047 (holding that “it is not unreasonable—and therefore not 
unconstitutional—for the Congress to prefer having in the aggregate more 
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Using the same criteria of competition and diversity to evaluate 
the FCC’s justifications of the CBCO rule under the 1996 Act, the 
court concluded that that rule could not be justified as a result of 
either.134 Rather than remanding to the FCC for further 
consideration as it had done with the NTSO rule, the court vacated 
the CBCO outright.135 
The court gave two reasons for the disparate treatment. First, 
the court repeatedly referred to the fact that, in 1999, the FCC had 
promulgated rules allowing a single entity to own two local 
television stations under certain circumstances.136 In support of the 
1999 rules, the FCC had concluded that “common ownership of 
two broadcast stations in the same local market need not unduly 
compromise diversity.”137 The court found that this conclusion 
contradicted the FCC’s current argument before the court that the 
CBCO was necessary to protect diversity and that, because the 
FCC had made “no attempt to harmonize [these] seemingly 
inconsistent decisions,” its diversity rationale was “woefully 
inadequate.”138 Second, whereas “the intervenors [on behalf of the 
FCC had] presented plausible reasons for thinking the NTSO rule 
[might] be necessary to further competition,” neither the FCC nor 
the intervenors had done so with respect to the CBCO rule.139 
The Fox opinion chastised the FCC several times for making 
                                                          
voices heard”). In making this determination, the court acknowledged that 
maintaining viewpoint diversity may result in greater inefficiencies in the 
television station market. Id. The court nonetheless concluded that “Congress 
may, in the regulation of broadcasting, constitutionally pursue values other than 
efficiency.” Id. 
134 Id. at 1051-52. 
135 Fox, 280 F.3d at 1049, 1053. On the one hand, the court found that “the 
probability that the Commission will be able to justify retaining the NTSO rule 
is sufficiently high that vacatur of the [NTSO] [r]ule is not appropriate.” Id. at 
1049. On the other, “[b]ecause the probability that the Commission would be 
able to justify retaining the CBCO rule is low and the disruption that vacatur 
will create is relatively insubstantial, we shall vacate the CBCO rule.” Id. at 
1053. 
136 Id. at 1051-52. 
137 Id. at 1052. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 1052-53. 
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decisions in the absence of a sufficiently fact-laden record.140 The 
implicit mandate to the FCC was that, in order to maintain rules in 
light of section 202(h), the Commission would have to come up 
with some “analytical or empirical” reasons for doing so.141 
2. The Sinclair Decision 
The second case, Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. v. FCC, 
followed soon after Fox.142 Sinclair, a broadcaster, challenged the 
FCC’s Local Ownership Order (LOO), which established certain 
conditions precedent before a broadcaster would be allowed to 
purchase more than one television station in any local market.143 
Sinclair specifically took issue with the FCC requirement that 
“eight . . . television stations . . . remain” after the transaction.144 
Sinclair alleged that the number eight had been “plucked . . . out of 
thin air” and that the inclusion of only broadcast television stations 
in the count was inconsistent with another FCC rule dealing with 
television-radio cross-ownership.145 That rule, in calculating the 
total number of media voices in a local market for purposes of 
allowing cross-ownership, included “certain local newspapers and 
cable television stations” in the count, while the LOO counted only 
broadcast television stations towards the total.146 Sinclair alleged 
that these inconsistencies rendered the LOO arbitrary and 
capricious.147 Sinclair also challenged the Order on First 
                                                          
140 Id. at 1044 (calling the record “woefully inadequate”); id. at 1044-45 
(“The Commission may, of course, change its mind, but it must explain why it is 
reasonable to do so.” (citation omitted)). 
141 Id. at 1048. 
142 Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The 
two decisions were handed down less than two months apart. Id.; Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2002), modified by 293 
F.3d 537 (2002). 
143 See supra note 112 (providing a more detailed description of the LOO). 
144 See id. 
145 Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 158-59. 
146 Id. at 155, 159. 
147 Id. at 158. 
KELLERMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  1:20 PM 
918 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Amendment grounds.148 
The court explicitly stated that it was reviewing the Local 
Ownership Order in light of the Fox holding that “section 202(h) 
carries with it a presumption in favor of repealing or modifying the 
ownership rules.”149 Finding the inconsistent definitions of media 
“voices” the dispositive issue,150 the Sinclair court held that the 
Order was arbitrary and capricious and remanded it for further 
consideration.151 Aside from this one flaw in the LOO, however, 
all of the other arguments Sinclair had made in support of 
overturning the Order were resolved in favor of the FCC.152 
3. A Possible Retreat? 
In a further development, four months after the Fox opinion 
was issued, the court modified the opinion after the FCC moved 
for a rehearing.153 Following the rehearing, the court agreed to 
modify a portion of the opinion that could be read to hold the FCC 
to a higher standard of justification for its rules in light of section 
202(h).154 The first Fox opinion had stated that “[The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996] is clear that a regulation should 
be retained only insofar as it is necessary in, not merely consonant 
with, the public interest.”155 The court decided to modify its 
opinion in order to leave open the question of “what section 202(h) 
                                                          
148 Id. at 152. 
149 Id. (citing Fox, 280 F.3d at 1048). 
150 See Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 160 (“But for our conclusion in Part III.C 
[discussing the inconsistency between the two rules] the Commission adequately 
explained how the local ownership rule furthers diversity at the local level and is 
necessary in the ‘public interest’ under § 202(h) of The Telecommunications 
Act of 1996.”). 
151 Id. at 169. 
152 Id. at 162 (passing over the argument against the selection of “eight” as 
the proper number of voices); id. at 165 (rejecting all of Sinclair’s arguments 
against certain grandfathering provisions of the Order); id. at 167 (rejecting 
Sinclair’s First Amendment challenges to the Order). 
153 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
154 Id. at 541. 
155 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 
2002). 
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means . . . .”156 The court explained its decision not to give section 
202(h) a definitive interpretation by noting that such an 
interpretation “was unnecessary to the outcome of the case at hand 
but might have had ill-considered implications for future cases.”157 
This modification of the Fox opinion leaves the “presumption” of 
invalidity of FCC rules under section 202(h) in doubt. 
B.  The Aftermath of Fox and Sinclair: The FCC Responds and 
the Mayhem Begins 
The FCC responded quickly to the Fox and Sinclair decisions, 
indicating that it would consider changes to the remanded rules as 
part of its 2002 biennial review.158 In an attempt to generate a more 
adequate record from which to make decisions, the FCC held a 
number of public events to gather comments.159 To stimulate 
public comment, the Commission also released to the public 
twelve independent studies it had commissioned on American 
media.160 
                                                          
156 Fox, 293 F.3d at 540. 
157 Id. at 540. The second Fox opinion explained that the decision in the 
first Fox opinion to remand the NTSO and vacate the CBCO did not turn on 
whether § 202(h) imposed upon the FCC the heightened standard of “necessary 
in the public interest” or simply the traditional standard of “in the public 
interest.” Id. According to the court, “[i]t was clear the Commission failed to 
justify the NTSO and the CBCO Rules under either standard.” Id. 
158 William LaRue, Owners to Get All Clear From FCC, THE POST-
STANDARD, Apr. 26, 2003, at E1. 
159 See Fed. Communications Comm’n, Transcript of Richmond En Banc 
Hearing on Broadcast Ownership, February 27, 2003 [hereinafter Richmond 
Hearing], at http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/richmond022703.html; Public 
Hearing on Media Ownership, Columbia University (excerpts available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/documents.html). 
160 As the following list shows, the twelve studies, most of which were 
released during the fall of 2002, covered a broad range of topics in broadcast 
policy: (1) FCCA Comparison of Media Outlets and Owners for Ten Selected 
Markets: 1960, 1980, 2000, (2) Viewpoint Diversity in Cross-Owned 
Newspapers and Television Stations: A Study of News Coverage of the 2000 
Presidential Campaign, (3) Consumer Substitution Among Media, (4) 
Consolidation and Advertising Prices in Local Radio Markets, (5) Program 
Diversity and the Program Selection Process on Broadcast Network Television, 
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The FCC voted on the 2002 biennial report on June 2, 2003.161 
In a 3-2 vote, the Commission adopted the report, which further 
deregulated the broadcast industry by weakening the ownership 
rules.162 The vote was split strictly along party lines.163 The major 
changes to the television ownership rules included: (1) the 
elimination of the two local cross-ownership bans on common 
ownership of (a) daily newspapers and broadcast outlets and (b) 
radio and television outlets; (2) the revision of the local television 
multiple ownership rule, and; (3) the modification of the national 
television ownership cap from a 35 percent national audience reach 
                                                          
(6) A Theory of Broadcast Media Concentration and Commercial Advertising, 
(7) The Measurement of Local Television News and Public Affairs Programs, 
(8) Consumer Survey on Media Usage, (9) Radio Market Structure and Music 
Diversity, (10) On the Substitutability of Local Newspaper, Radio, and 
Television Advertising in Local Business Sales, (11) Radio Industry Review 
2002: Trends in Ownership, Format, and Finance, and (12) Broadcast 
Television: Survivor in a Sea of Competition. The studies can be viewed in their 
entirety on the FCC’s website. See Media Ownership Working Group Studies, at 
http://www.fcc.gov/ ownership/studies.html. 
161 The FCC received eight separate letters from Congress requesting that 
the vote be delayed. See Fed. Communications Comm’n, Chairman Michael K. 
Powell Responds to Members Regarding Upcoming Biennial Review of Media 
Ownership, at http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/powell/chairmans_ response 
(last visited April 1, 2004). One of the letters urged the FCC to “ensure that 
Congress and the public have a full opportunity to review and comment on any 
specific changes.” Letter to Chairman Powell from Senators Snow, Allard, and 
Collins, March 19, 2003, at http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/powell/ 
chairmans_response/Snowe_March19.pdf. In addition, FCC Commissioner 
Adelstien warned his colleagues that “the FCC must proceed with caution . . . . 
Further media consolidation can’t easily be undone. Once the toothpaste is out 
of the tube, it’s going to be difficult, if not impossible to put it back in.” 
Richmond Hearing, supra note 135, at 37. 
162 Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations 
and Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local 
Markets, and Definition of Radio Markets, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003) 
[hereinafter the 2003 Order]. 
163 Neil Roland, FCC Expected to Loosen Media Ownership Today, 
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, June 2, 2003, at 63. As expected, the three Republican 
commissioners (Abernathy, Martin, and Chairman Powell) voted to relax the 
rules. Id. The two Democratic commissioners (Adelstien and Copps) dissented. 
Id. 
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limit to 45 percent. The Order containing the rule changes also 
restated the Commission’s belief that scarcity (and apparently any 
regulation justified thereby) was an obsolete concept.164 
1. The New Cross-Ownership Rules 
The 2003 Order replaced the newspaper-TV station cross-
ownership ban and radio-TV cross-ownership ban (both of which 
prohibited cross-ownership in all local markets nationwide) with a 
complex set of cross-media limits based on market size.165 These 
limits were calculated using a new metric, called the “Diversity 
Index,” designed to “provide [the FCC’s] media ownership 
framework with an empirical footing.”166 In the time since the 
2003 Order was released, opponents of the new rules, and one 
United States Circuit Court of Appeals, have expressed doubt as to 
the reliability of the Diversity Index and any cross-media limits 
derived therefrom.167 
                                                          
164 See The 2003 Order, supra note 162, ¶ 52. The Order noted that, unlike 
the broadcast world in which the scarcity rationale evolved, the modern world is 
“characterized not by information scarcity, but by media abundance.” Id. 
165 Id. at 46,312-26 ¶ 229-332. After an exhaustive review of the comments 
and data, the FCC concluded that neither cross-ownership ban was “necessary in 
the public interest.” Id. at 46,312 ¶ 229. Various cross-media limits are 
prescribed, with perhaps the most significant change being that in large markets, 
defined as those having nine or more TV stations, the FCC imposed no cross-
media restrictions at all. Id. at 46,325 ¶ 327. 
166 Id. at 46,316 ¶ 263. The desire to provide a more “empirical” foundation 
for the rules seems to be a direct response to the Fox court’s requirement of a 
higher standard of rule justification. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying 
text. Based on a consumer survey conducted by the FCC in which members of 
the public were asked what types of media they used to obtain local news, the 
Diversity Index (DI) attempts to give relative “weights” to different types of 
media (newspapers, broadcast television, radio, and the Internet) for the 
purposes of calculating the level of viewpoint diversity in a given market. Id. 
The science behind the DI comes from the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), 
used by anti-trust agencies to calculate the expected loss of competition in an 
industry from a proposed merger. Id. ¶ 267. 
167 See MARK COOPER, MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND DEMOCRACY IN THE 
DIGITAL INFORMATION AGE 191-212 (2003), available at http://cyberlaw. 
stanford.edu/blogs/cooper/archives/mediabooke.pdf. Cooper’s major attack on 
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2. The New Local Television Ownership Rule 
The FCC also modified the Local Ownership Order at issue in 
Sinclair.168 The new rule would allow common ownership of “two 
television broadcast stations in markets with 17 or fewer television 
stations, and up to three stations in markets with 18 or more 
television stations.”169 Responding to the inconsistency pointed out 
by the Sinclair court that other FCC rules included non-broadcast 
media in the calculation of media voices in a given market, the 
FCC fashioned its new local television ownership limits on the 
premise that “media other than television broadcast stations 
contribute to viewpoint diversity in local markets.”170 
3. The New NTSO Rule 
The NTSO rule was relaxed so that a broadcaster could own 
stations reaching 45 percent of the national audience.171 This 
change was made despite the Fox court’s belief that “the 
probability that the Commission will be able to justify retaining the 
NTSO Rule is sufficiently high . . . .”172 FCC Chairman Michael 
                                                          
the DI is that, in giving each media type a particular weight in terms of 
viewpoint diversity, it ignores the vast disparities in weights among different 
firms within each media type. Id. at 194. Cooper points out several odd results 
that obtain when the DI is applied to a given market. Id. For example, the DI 
concludes that the owner of the Dutchess Community College TV station (a 
small local college broadcaster) has more weight than the New York Times. Id. 
at 193. Moreover, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals used this same example 
during oral argument in a case dealing with the new ownership rules, 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388 (3d Cir. 2003), indicating that 
the Court is, in the words of the lead public-interest attorney in that case, “very 
concerned that the diversity index is flawed.” See Media Access Project, Report 
on Oral Argument in Media Ownership Court Challenge in Prometheus Radio 
Project v. FCC (last visited Apr. 1, 2004) at http://www.mediaaccess. org/ 
MAPOralArg02-12-04.pdf. 
168 See The 2003 Order at 46,294 ¶ 81. 
169 Id. ¶ 83. 
170 See id. ¶ 82. 
171 The 2003 Order at 46,328 ¶ 351. 
172 Fox, 280 F.3d at 1049. 
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K. Powell explained this change in part by recognizing that 
national networks needed to own more stations if they were to be 
able to satisfy “the public interest benefit of keeping high quality 
programming on free over the air TV.”173 
After the vote, Chairman Powell attempted to explain his 
failure to heed the many calls for more time to consider the 
changes.174 He argued that the Fox and Sinclair decisions gave the 
FCC no option but to modify the rules175 and that only Congress 
had the power to maintain the rules as they were.176 
4. Opposition in Congress and the Courts 
Members of Congress, some of them especially upset by the 
FCC vote, acted quickly to reverse the rule changes by adding 
amendments to the appropriations bill funding the FCC for 
2004.177 After the June 2 FCC vote, several networks and public-
interest organizations brought separate challenges to the new rules 
in federal court, and these challenges were consolidated before the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals.178 On September 3, 2003, the court 
granted a stay order that prevented the FCC’s new rules from 
                                                          
173 See Statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell, 2002 Biennial 
Regulatory Review, at 10, at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/FCC-03-127A3.doc (released July 2, 2003) [hereinafter Powell 
Statement]. 
174 See id. at 1. 
175 Id. On the first page of his statement, Chairman Powell stressed the 
“irreducible” point that “[k]eeping the rules exactly as they are, as some so 
stridently suggest, was not a viable option. Without today’s surgery, the rules 
would assuredly have met a swift death.” Id. In all of his citations to the Fox 
decision, Chairman Powell only included the original citation, failing to note the 
modification the court later made to some of the more deregulatory-minded 
language in the original opinion. Id. 
176 Id. “Leaving things unaltered, regardless of changes in the competitive 
landscape, is a course that only Congress can legitimately chart.” Id. 
177 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text; see also The Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2004, H.R. 2673, 108th Cong. (2004). Congress was 
ultimately successful only in repealing the NTSO and setting a statutory national 
cap of 39 percent. Id. 
178 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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going into effect pending the outcome of the litigation.179 A few 
weeks later, the Third Circuit denied the networks’ request to 
transfer the venue of their case to the D.C. Circuit, which had 
taken a deregulatory position in the Fox and Sinclair decisions.180 
Although the networks made a strong case favoring the propriety 
of transfer,181 two of the three judges on the panel held that the 
June 2 FCC rule changes were not sufficiently close to the Fox and 
Sinclair decisions to warrant transfer to the court that had issued 
those decisions.182 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The FCC gave both legal and policy justifications for relaxing 
media ownership rules on June 2, 2003. The legal justification, 
simply put, was that the Fox and Sinclair decisions were a judicial 
ultimatum to the FCC that unless the rules were relaxed or 
rescinded the Court would itself vacate the rules.183 The policy 
justifications centered around two general ideas: first, that the vast 
increase in sources of information resulting from the rise in 
popularity of cable and the internet rendered fears of oligopolistic 
media control baseless,184 and second, that deregulation was 
required to maintain high-quality entertainment on free, over-the-
air television.185 
                                                          
179 Order of September 3, 2003, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-
3388 (3d Cir. 2003). 
180 Order of September 16, 2003, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 
03-3388 (3d Cir. 2003). 
181 See id. (Scirica, C.J., dissenting). 
182 Id. at 4. 
183 See Powell Statement, supra note 173, at 1. According to Chairman 
Powell’s view, “[w]ithout today’s surgery, the rules would assuredly have met a 
swift death.” Id. 
184 See The 2003 Order, supra note 3, ¶ 52 (finding that, unlike the 
broadcast marketplace in the past, today’s communications market is 
“characterized not by information scarcity, but by media abundance”). 
185 See The 2003 Order, supra note 3, at 46,329 ¶ 352 (raising the NTSO 
cap from 35 percent to 45 percent on the grounds that allowing broadcasters to 
reach larger audiences “will help networks compete more effectively with cable 
and [satellite] operators and will promote free, over-the-air television by 
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The legal justifications given by the FCC for their decision to 
deregulate broadcast media ownership on June 2 were unsound and 
reflect an inappropriately broad interpretation of the Fox and 
Sinclair decisions. As such, the FCC’s decision to deregulate must 
be judged primarily on the Commission’s policy choices. These 
choices fundamentally misjudge the implications of the changing 
media landscape and seriously miss the appropriate balance 
between the value of popular television entertainment and the 
maintenance of a wide diversity of viewpoints in public discourse. 
The June 2 rule changes risk serious harm to the public interest that 
the FCC is mandated to pursue in its exercise of rulemaking 
authority under both the Communications Act of 1934 and the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Specifically, it is likely that 
viewpoint diversity will suffer if the new rules deregulating 
broadcast ownership are allowed to take effect. Therefore, since 
the FCC did in fact have more authority to shape its rules than it 
chose to exercise, the Commission should assume responsibility 
for the folly of its decision. 
A.  Did the D.C. Court of Appeals Go Too Far? 
One possible explanation of Congress’ adverse reaction to the 
FCC’s June 2 vote is that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
misread congressional intent when it interpreted the 1996 Act to 
create a presumption of invalidity of FCC rules. The FCC based its 
decision to deregulate to a large extent on this judicial gloss on the 
1996 Act.186 Perhaps the Congressional backlash to the FCC’s 
decision is an expression that the court got it wrong. 
On its face, section 202(h) merely requires the FCC to re-
evaluate the rules every two years and modify or repeal those rules 
it determines are no longer in the public interest.187 For the Fox 
                                                          
deterring migration of expensive programming to cable networks”). 
186 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
187 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 §202(h). “The Commission shall 
review . . . all of its ownership rules biennially . . . and shall determine whether 
any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as the result of competition. 
The Commission shall repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no 
longer in the public interest.” Id. The Fox opinion’s interpretation of § 202(h) in 
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court to derive a presumption of invalidity from this review 
requirement, it could have analyzed the Congressional record 
surrounding the 1996 Act; however, in the Fox opinion there is a 
conspicuous lack of consideration of the legislative history relating 
to section 202(h).188 The court merely reiterated several 
deregulatory provisions of the 1996 Act189 and, without more, 
imputed to section 202(h) a “presumption in favor of repealing or 
modifying the ownership rules.”190 
There is evidence that motives other than deregulation for the 
public interest were behind section 202(h). For example, large 
corporate broadcasters, preferring deregulation for economic 
reasons, lobbied heavily to obtain favorable legislation.191 In 
                                                          
some respects gives the FCC more discretion to maintain its rules than is 
apparent on the face of the statute. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 
F.3d 1027, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Whereas § 202(h) only mentions 
“competition” as a basis for determining whether a rule is “necessary in the 
public interest,” the Fox court held that “[i]n the context of the regulation of 
broadcasting, the public interest has historically embraced diversity (as well as 
localism), and nothing in section 202(h) signals a departure from that historic 
scope.” Fox, 280 F.3d at 1042. 
188 The Fox court did refer to the Congressional Record relevant to The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 at one point in its opinion, but it was to refute 
the FCC’s argument that the NTSO’s 35 percent limit should be maintained in 
deference to the comments of the ranking member of the relevant House 
subcommittee. The court concluded that “[t]his legislative history is no basis 
whatever for the [FCC’s] decision.” Fox, 280 F.3d at 1043. 
189 See Fox, 280 F.3d at 1033. 
190 Id. at 1048. 
191 See Bethany M. Burns, Reforming the Newspaper Industry: Achieving 
First Amendment Goals of Diversity Through Structural Regulation, 5 COMM. 
LAW CONSPECTUS 61, 68 n.91 (1997) (discussing strong lobbying by large 
media corporations during deliberations on The Telecommunications Act of 
1996); John McCain, Telecom Ownership Needs To Be Diversified, THE HILL, 
October 20, 1999, at 23. McCain, Republican Senator from Arizona, called the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 a “lemon,” pointing out that during 
negotiations over the Act, “special interests had a seat at the table, but 
consumers, in whose name the bill was advanced, did not.” Id. Such lobbying 
efforts by Big Media have historically pervaded broadcast regulation. See 
ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND 
DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935 
passim (1993). 
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addition, Professor Thomas Krattenmaker, a telecommunications 
law authority of some note,192 made statements at one of the FCC’s 
public hearings that raise the possibility that another powerful 
interest group, the Telecommunications Bar, had an independent, 
vested interest in the biennial review provisions of the 1996 Act.193 
B. The Fox and Sinclair Decisions Did Not Leave the FCC 
With No Other Choice 
The Fox and Sinclair courts certainly contain language 
interpreting section 202(h) as charting a hasty deregulatory course 
for broadcast ownership.194 The FCC’s June 2 vote, however, went 
significantly beyond Fox and Sinclair. Not only did the 2003 Order 
modify rules that were not before the court in those cases, but the 
FCC’s reliance on those cases to relax the rules at issue in Fox and 
                                                          
192 Mr. Krattenmaker, who once clerked on the Supreme Court for Justice 
Harlan, has had a long career in telecommunications law and policy spanning 
government work, private practice, and academia. See Richmond Hearing, supra 
note 159, at 37. 
193 Professor Krattenmaker, who moderated a public FCC media ownership 
hearing in Richmond, Virginia in February, 2003, noted the vast pecuniary gain 
the Telecommunications Bar would reap from § 202(h) of the 1996 Act. See 
Richmond Hearing, supra note 159, at 43-44. Discussing the biennial review 
process, and the work created for lawyers by each review, Krattenmaker stated, 
“[t]alk about the communication lawyers perpetual guaranteed income act. I join 
with all other members of the Federal Communications Bar Association in 
expressing our undying gratitude to Congress for having dug this very deep 
trough at which we may feed for years on end” Id. There is precedent for the 
ability of organized industry lawyers’ associations to mold legislation to help 
their legal practices. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY 
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA, 44-46 (discussing the influence of the 
nascent bankruptcy bar on federal bankruptcy legislation in the early twentieth 
century); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in 
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1939-40 (1998) (citing several 
sources for the proposition that the influence of the corporate bar “has made 
Delaware law indeterminate and litigation-oriented in order to generate demand 
for legal services”). 
194 See Fox, 280 F.3d at 1044. “[T]he mandate of § 202(h) might better be 
likened to Farragut’s order at the battle of Mobile Bay (‘Damn the torpedoes! 
Full speed ahead.’) than to the wait-and-see attitude of the Commission.” Id. 
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Sinclair ignored several portions of those opinions that left the 
FCC the option to both keep the rules and satisfy the Fox court’s 
requirement of more “analytical or empirical” evidence to keep 
them.195 The June 2 vote relaxed both the newspaper-TV and 
radio-TV cross ownership bans, yet neither of these rules was at 
issue in Fox and Sinclair.196 Of the three rules considered in the 
Fox and Sinclair cases, only one, the CBCO, was vacated; the 
other two were simply remanded for further consideration.197 
Moreover, the Local Ownership Order at issue in Sinclair was 
remanded on narrow grounds; all but one of the arguments against 
that rule were resolved in favor of maintaining it.198 These facts 
seem to belie Chairman Powell’s assertions that the rules as 
previously written would “assuredly have met a swift death” in the 
courts.199 
Contrary to Chairman Powell’s reading of Fox and Sinclair to 
create a vice-like grip on the FCC’s rulemaking discretion, a more 
realistic interpretation of those opinions might have led the 
Commission merely to conclude that section 202(h) of the 1996 
Act raised the standard of FCC justification and that a better 
factual predicate for retention of the rules would be required. The 
two dissenting members of the FCC adopted this view in their 
statements accompanying the vote.200 Commissioner Copps read 
the Fox and Sinclair opinions to require better justifications, not 
                                                          
195 Id. at 1048. 
196 See The 2003 Order, supra note 3, at 46,312-26 ¶ 229-332. 
197 See supra notes 130 (remanding the NTSO), 135 (vacating the CBCO), 
151 (remanding the LOO) and accompanying text. 
198 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. As discussed supra, the 
LOO was remanded to the FCC on the sole ground that an earlier FCC rule 
defined the term “media voices” more broadly than did the LOO. Id. In 
repealing the LOO, the FCC never considered the possibility of modifying the 
earlier rule’s definition of “voices” to be consistent with the LOO, an option that 
would have equally answered the Sinclair court’s objection to that rule. 
199 See Powell Statement, supra note 173, at 1. 
200 See Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Dissenting, at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-127A5.doc 
[hereinafter Copps statement]; Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. 
Adelstien, Dissenting, at 3, at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/FCC-03-127A7.doc [hereinafter Adelstien statement]. 
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outright deregulation.201 Copps believed that the factual record 
amassed by the FCC adequately justified maintaining the rules 
under the two decisions.202 Commissioner Adelstien echoed these 
sentiments in his statement.203 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
adopted this more reasonable interpretation of the Fox and Sinclair 
opinions as well.204 
Moreover, to the extent the FCC’s decision was based on a 
view that the scarcity doctrine no longer justifies ownership 
regulations, the Fox and Sinclair decisions certainly did not 
remove any of the long-standing authority of the FCC to 
promulgate rules in the public interest. To do so would have been 
to ignore the consistent holdings of the Supreme Court in NBC and 
its progeny that the FCC has broad authority to promulgate rules in 
the exercise of its special expertise on the public interest as it 
applies to broadcasting.205 As both the Fox and Sinclair opinions 
recognized, the Supreme Court has never indicated that the FCC’s 
authority in this realm has diminished, despite the many calls from 
Big Media that technological advances have rendered the scarcity 
doctrine obsolete.206 
                                                          
201 See Copps statement, supra note 200, at 8. “[Under Fox and Sinclair] 
we are obligated to present reasoned rationales with more compelling 
explanations than we have thus far presented. But we are not instructed to 
radically restructure the rules.” (emphasis in original). Id. 
202 Id. “The evidence we have amassed points to the need for maintaining 
existing media concentration protections.” Id. 
203 See Adelstien statement, supra note 200, at 3. “The Fox and Sinclair 
courts sent the rules back to us for justification, not for evisceration.” Id. 
204 Order of September 16, 2003, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 
03-3388 at 4-5 (3d Cir. 2003). “The D.C. Circuit Court simply instructed the 
FCC to justify its rules on media ownership with an eye to the public interest.” 
Id. 
205 See supra notes 60, 63 and accompanying text. 
206 See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1046 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002), modified by 293 F.3d 537 (2002). The court rejected Fox’s First 
Amendment argument that the scarcity doctrine should no longer apply because 
of new technologies, holding that “[t]he Supreme Court has already heard the 
empirical case against [the scarcity] rationale and still ‘declined to question its 
continuing validity.’” Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 638 (1994)); Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 169 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002) (rejecting Sinclair’s argument that the scarcity doctrine should no 
KELLERMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  1:20 PM 
930 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Finally, even assuming that Chairman Powell’s reading of Fox 
and Sinclair is tenable, his belief that maintaining the rules was not 
an option after those decisions assumes that every possible 
reviewing court would agree with the opinion of the D.C. Court of 
Appeals. But the Third Circuit made it clear, in refusing to transfer 
the venue of the challenges to the FCC’s rule changes, that the 
D.C. Circuit did not have exclusive jurisdiction over such 
challenges.207 
C. Sinclair on the Diversity Prong of The Public Interest 
In addition to those aspects of the Fox and Sinclair opinions 
suggesting that those opinions did not significantly constrain the 
FCC’s rulemaking authority, one other idea discussed in Sinclair 
concerning diversity and its relationship to the public interest 
merits attention.208 It will, however, be helpful to briefly review 
the place of diversity in the hierarchy of traditional notions of the 
                                                          
longer apply on the grounds that “‘nothing in the subsequent decisions of the 
[Supreme] Court has called the constitutional validity of the [NCCB] doctrine 
into question.’” (quoting Tribune Co. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 61, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
Other sections of the Fox and Sinclair opinions do not take as deferential a 
stance to Supreme Court precedent. To the extent that Fox and Sinclair require 
the FCC to provide more of an empirical or analytical justification of their rules, 
they are ignoring the Supreme Court’s observation in NCCB that “[d]iversity 
and its effects are . . . elusive concepts, not easily defined let alone 
measured . . . .” FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 796-97 
(1978). As is characteristic of many public goods, the public benefits derived 
from diverse ownership of the tools of mass communication simply cannot be 
measured to the same degree of accuracy as can the economic benefits of 
consolidation. If Fox and Sinclair indeed require this degree of accuracy, the 
D.C. Court of Appeals is simply asking the impossible. Such a requirement 
would be tantamount to judicial appropriation of power traditionally held by the 
FCC. 
207 Order of September 16, 2003, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 
03-3388 at 5 (3d Cir. 2003). “[I]f Congress had meant to give the D.C. Circuit 
Court exclusive jurisdiction over such appeals, it would have explicitly done 
so . . . .” Id. The Third Circuit also pointed out that, even if the D.C. Circuit 
Court were to assume jurisdiction over the current case, a different panel of 
judges than those who issued the Fox and Sinclair decisions would hear it. Id. 
208 Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 161. 
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public interest. 
Debates over the meaning of the public interest have always 
swirled around two main concepts: competition (the undue 
concentration of economic power) and diversity.209 This note 
contends that the public interest in the broadcasting context cannot 
be adequately protected by rules based on competition (i.e. 
antitrust) grounds alone. Rather, to protect viewpoint diversity, a 
greater degree of regulation is required than merely that amount 
necessary to ensure against undue concentrations of economic 
power.210 The following analysis of a portion of the Sinclair 
opinion discussing diversity highlights the need for greater 
                                                          
209 See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing competition and 
diversity in broadcast regulation). The FCC has traditionally viewed “diversity” 
as being comprised of four distinct categories. See In the matter of 2002 
Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast 
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 17 F.C.C. Rcd 18503, 18516 (2002). These 
four categories are (1) viewpoint diversity, (2) outlet diversity, (3) source 
diversity, and (4) program diversity. Viewpoint diversity “ensures that the public 
has access to a wide range of diverse and antagonistic opinions and 
interpretations,” and “has been the touchstone of the Commission’s ownership 
rules and policies.” Id. Outlet diversity is “the control of media outlets by a 
variety of independent owners.” Id. Source diversity “ensures that the public has 
access to information and programming from multiple content providers” Id. 
Program diversity refers to “a variety of programming formats and content” Id. 
210 See Brenner, supra note 49, at 1018-19. Brenner refers to this added 
degree of scrutiny specific to media mergers as “antitrust-plus.” Id. Robert 
Pitofsky, a former chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, articulated the 
rationale for antitrust-plus scrutiny in broadcasting. Testifying before the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights, he said, 
“Concern about concentrated economic power should be given added weight 
where the merger (or a wave of mergers) concerns companies involved in the 
communication of ideas. In those industries, there is more at stake than high 
prices or low quality to consumers - there is a more fundamental issue of 
avoiding centralized control over access to the marketplace of ideas.” Id. at n.64. 
In the 2003 Order, the FCC partially accepted this view that economic-based 
regulations would not in all cases protect viewpoint diversity. See the 2003 
Order, supra note 3, at 46,289 ¶ 35 (noting that “our analysis of the record leads 
us to conclude that preserving competitive markets will not, in all cases, 
adequately protect viewpoint diversity.”). The FCC, however, incorrectly 
limited this conclusion to “smaller markets.” Id. 
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government regulation to protect this interest.211 
The “public convenience interest, convenience, and necessity” 
has traditionally been a catch-all phrase that has been used to 
validate a wide range of regulatory philosophies.212 During the first 
fifty years of broadcast regulation, the FRC and, later, the FCC 
determined that satisfying the public interest required both 
behavioral and structural regulation.213 From the late 1970s until 
the present, changing notions of the public interest have led to a 
virtual abandonment of behavioral regulations and have left a mix 
of market control and an increasingly impotent regime of structural 
regulations.214 This progressive deregulation of broadcasting is the 
product of a laissez-faire perspective that the market is a better 
provider for the public interest in most cases than a rule regime 
maintained by government.215 Because the public interest clearly 
                                                          
211 This statement assumes that “competition” as applied to public interest 
analysis means solely economic competition - the Fox and Sinclair decisions 
made this assumption. See Fox, 280 F.3d at 1041 (equating “competition” 
concerns with concerns of “undue market power”); Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 160 
(referring to the FCC’s justifications on grounds of “economic competition”). A 
non-economic conception of competition, that is, fair competition in the 
“marketplace of ideas,” is roughly equivalent to the concept of viewpoint 
diversity. See Bruce M. Owen, Regulatory Reform: The Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 and the FCC Media Ownership Rules, 2003 DET. C.L. REV. 671 (2003) 
(equating “the FCC’s traditional concern with competition in the marketplace of 
ideas and information” with “diversity”). The remainder of this note will use the 
term “competition” to refer to solely economic competition, while the term 
“viewpoint diversity” will encompass any form of non-economic competition. 
Suffice it to say that this author believes that a lack of clarity and common 
understanding in the use of such terms as “competition” and “diversity” is a 
major factor in the obscurity of the underlying interests involved. 
212 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the broad “public 
interest” standard). An early commentator may have been exercising a great deal 
of precognition when he stated, “[the public interest means] about as little as any 
phrase that the drafters of the [Radio] Act could have used and still comply with 
the constitutional requirement that there be some standard to guide the 
administrative wisdom of the licensing authority.” Fowler, supra note 78, at 
214-215 (quoting Louis Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience, 
or Necessity as Used in The Radio Act of 1927, 1 AIR L. REV. 295, 296 (1930)). 
213 See supra Part I.C-D. 
214 See supra Part I.E-F. 
215 See, e.g., Brenner & Fowler, supra note 93, at 210. 
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means different things to different people, however, a discussion 
on the merits of these competing philosophies is meaningless 
unless a more precise definition (or definitions) of the public 
interest is identified.216 
The Sinclair opinion recognized this confusion and, in bringing 
it to light, suggested a course by which the FCC could have 
adequately justified the remanded rules. The court pointed out a 
miscommunication between the parties concerning their respective 
definitions of “diversity.” The court noted that the FCC’s 
arguments in support of the Local Ownership Order focused 
largely on “viewpoint diversity,” defined as “station owners 
bringing unique points of view to the selection of material they 
air.”217 The networks, on the other hand, argued against the rule on 
grounds of “programming diversity,” which the court defined as 
“the number of different types of programs on the air, regardless of 
whether they reflect differing editorial viewpoints.”218 This 
distinction complicated the debate over the Local Ownership Order 
because the broadcasters argued that the rule was irrational as a 
means to promote “programming diversity,” while the FCC 
defended the rule as a rational means to protect “viewpoint 
diversity.”219 In highlighting the different definitions of “diversity” 
utilized by the parties, the Sinclair opinion also stated that 
broadcaster Sinclair’s arguments “overstate[d] the burden” on the 
FCC to justify the rule.220 The court recognized that it could not 
require the FCC to predict harms to viewpoint diversity with 
greater particularity or precision without being unfaithful to current 
Supreme Court scarcity doctrine.221 Dissenting in the Sinclair 
court’s judgment, Judge Sentelle reiterated the conflicting 
                                                          
216 Compare id. (advocating a market-controlled broadcast policy because 
“[t]he public’s interest, then, defines the public interest”) with Cass R. Sunstien, 
Television and the Public Interest, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 499, 501 (1999) (“There is 
a large difference between the public interest and what interests the public.”). 
217 Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 161 (emphasis added). 
218 Id. (emphasis added). 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 161 (rejecting broadcaster’s argument that changes in the media 
market place a higher burden of justification on the FCC). 
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definitions of diversity relied upon by the parties and suggested 
that, in order to maintain the rule, “the Commission should define 
its diversity goal, and in doing so explain the distinctions (and 
interaction) between programming diversity and viewpoint 
diversity, rather than simply quoting boilerplate on the 
‘elusiveness’ of diversity.”222 
These discussions further suggest that, had a majority of the 
FCC been so inclined, the Commission could have adequately 
justified the NTSO rule and the Local Ownership Order following 
remand by the Fox and Sinclair courts, not to mention those rules 
which were not before the court in those cases, by emphasizing the 
primary importance of viewpoint diversity and stressing the need 
for strong ownership rules to preserve viewpoint diversity and the 
benefits it bestows upon public discourse in our nation. 
D. Further Media Ownership Deregulation Is Dangerous and 
Unwise Policy 
The foregoing arguments reveal the shaky foundation on which 
the FCC based its legal justification for the requirement of further 
media deregulation. The FCC continues to hold broad powers to 
promulgate broadcast ownership rules in the public interest. As 
such, the FCC’s decision to relax its rules on June 2, 2003 was not 
a product of external judicial coercion, but rather a discretionary 
choice not to exercise such power. 
That is not to say the FCC’s decision was illegitimate; just 
because the FCC once thought rules were necessary in the public 
interest does not prevent it from eventually changing its mind.223 In 
this case, however, the voluntary decision by the FCC to 
deregulate dangerously fails to provide for the public interest, 
particularly the public’s interest in viewpoint diversity. Even if 
greater concentration of broadcast ownership is, as the FCC 
maintains, required to maintain the “high” quality of current over-
                                                          
222 Sinclair, 284 F.3d 148, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
223 See Pinellas Broad. Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
“[A] Commission’s view of what is best in the public interest may change from 
time to time. Commissions themselves change, underlying philosophies differ, 
and experience often dictates changes.” Id. 
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the-air broadcasting,224 arguments to that effect fail to give due 
weight to the potential effects of further deregulation on viewpoint 
diversity. There may indeed be some public benefits gained from 
allowing media corporations to own more television stations.225 
These potential benefits, however, do not justify the risks involved 
and, in any event, sufficient safeguards are not in place to 
effectively guard against the public harms consolidation is likely to 
cause. The fact that these harms are difficult to measure makes 
them no less dangerous.226 Indeed, it may make them more so. 
1.  The New Rules Will Lead to Further Consolidation of 
Broadcast Ownership 
There is strong evidence that the new rules adopted by the FCC 
on June 2, which raise the number of television stations a single 
company can own locally and completely eliminate the 
corresponding national cap, will lead to further consolidation of 
broadcasting power in the hands of fewer owners. First, 
deregulation in other industries often has the effect of 
consolidation.227 Second, media commentators have historically 
                                                          
224 Reference to the current state of broadcast television quality as “high” 
reflects the operating ideology of the FCC and the networks (and some viewers, 
no doubt), and in no way reflects the personal opinion of the author. 
225 See Brenner, supra note 49, at 1026-27. Brenner gives some examples 
of benefits he thinks might flow from allowing media companies to grow larger, 
including the ability to: (1) “finance start-up content activity that smaller entities 
cannot afford”; (2) “combat government censorship and support First 
Amendment freedoms,” and; (3) “expand speech diversity” by expanding into 
niche markets. Id. 
226 See FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 796-97 
(1978) (“Diversity and its effects are . . . elusive concepts, not easily defined let 
alone measured. . . .”). It is not hard to understand why it is difficult to measure 
and report a lack of viewpoint diversity in broadcasting. In addition to all the 
common problems generally involved in proving a negative, in this instance one 
so inclined has the added burdens of identifying voices that are not being heard 
and then making the result of this effort itself heard above the din of commercial 
media. 
227 See Alison Harcourt, The European Commission and Regulation of the 
Media Industry, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 425, 429-30 (1998) (discussing 
media deregulation causing ownership consolidation in the European Union); 
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noted that in the search for larger audiences, media companies 
naturally expand.228 Third, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
which called for an immediate and severe deregulation of the radio 
industry, resulted in an “orgy of consolidation” in the three years 
following enactment.229 Less quantitative, but perhaps equally 
probative, is the fact that the majority of the petitioners in the 
lawsuits challenging the FCC regulations under the 1996 Act are 
large corporations already possessing a significant number of 
stations and seeking to possess even more.230 
                                                          
Richard D. Cudahy, The FERC’s Policy on Electric Mergers: A Bit of 
Perspective, 18 ENERGY L. J. 113 (1997) (in energy provider markets); PAUL S. 
DEMPSEY, LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 146-49 
(1987) (in the airline industry). 
228 See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS 
COMMUNICATIONS Vol. II 617 (1947) (concluding that, due to economic 
pressures to expand, “bigness in the press is here to stay, whether we like it or 
not”). Chafee’s arguments were directed at the radio industry—then the 
dominant form of broadcasting. They apply with equal force, however, to 
television today. 
229 Baker, supra note 53, at 868 (citing Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & 
Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum: Media Power, Democracy, and 
the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 815 n.7 (2000)). Baker 
gives as an example the statistic that “at the time of The Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, the largest radio ownership group consisted of less than forty 
stations. By September 2000, a single owner held over 1,000 of the country’s 
12,600 stations.” Id. at n.154 (citations omitted); see also George Williams & 
Scott Roberts, Radio Industry Review 2002: Trends in Ownership, Format, and 
Finance (2002) at 3, at hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
226838A20.doc. This FCC-sponsored study found that, between March 1996 
and March 2002, there was an increase in the number of commercial radio 
stations of 5.4 percent. Id. During the same period, the number of radio owners 
declined by 34 percent. Id. 
230 For example, a brief search on an internet financial information database 
reveals the vast holdings of the two main petitioners in the Fox and Sinclair 
cases. “Fox Television Stations owns and operates 35 full-power stations located 
in nine designated market areas. Fox has 188 affiliated stations, including 25 
full-power television stations that are owned by subsidiaries of the Company.” 
Yahoo! Finance, available at http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=FOX (last visited 
April 1, 2004); “Sinclair’s television group includes 20 FOX, 19 WB, 6 UPN, 8 
ABC, 3 CBS, 4 NBC affiliates and 2 independent stations and reaches 
approximately 24% of all U.S. television households.” Sinclair homepage, 
available at http://www.sbgi. net/business/television.shtml (last visited April 1, 
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This is not to say that the FCC’s deregulatory mission should 
be halted just because it will result in consolidation. Indeed, the 
FCC emphatically pointed to certain results from its research that 
indicated that more consolidation might actually benefit the public 
interest.231 Other commentators have also suggested that certain 
facets of the public interest, such as program diversity, are 
enhanced by allowing large media corporations to amass greater 
broadcasting capability.232 
These possible benefits, however, must be weighed against the 
risks deregulation poses to viewpoint diversity. Commentators 
have pointed to several potential harms media consolidation may 
engender.233 In one way or another, all of the foregoing risks flow 
from decreased viewpoint diversity, regardless of whether the 
                                                          
2004). 
231 See Powell statement, supra note 173, at 9 (“We found the national cap 
restrains the networks from serving additional communities with more local 
news and public affairs programming.”); Editorial, The ‘Friends’ Factor at the 
FCC, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 18, 2003, at 25 (paraphrasing FCC 
chairman Michael Powell’s warning that, unless the national ownership cap was 
lifted, big networks like NBC might not be able to continue to afford the high 
production costs of sit-coms like Friends and other shows of “that quality”). Id 
232 See Brenner, supra note 49, at 1026-27 (giving several examples of 
increased “diversity” that may occur if companies are allowed to grow larger). 
233 The thesis of this note is that viewpoint diversity should be an 
overriding interest in broadcast regulation regardless of the benefits media 
consolidation may bring. Therefore, detailed criticism of the merits of 
deregulation offered by its proponents is beyond the scope of this note. Briefly, 
however, the following arguments might be made: (1) The FCC concluded that 
the NTSO cap should be raised because commonly-programmed (i.e. network-
affiliated) stations actually produce more local news programming than 
independent stations. See the 2003 Order, supra note 3, at 46,339 ¶ 425. More 
local news, however, does not necessarily mean better local news, especially if 
the increased “local” news is dictated by management far away, thus removing 
the true “local” nature of the viewpoints presented; (2) As to the list of benefits 
proffered by Brenner (supra note 225), he mentions the increased ability large 
corporations have to “combat government censorship and support First 
Amendment freedoms.” Brenner, supra note 49, at 1026-27. This benefit might 
shine less brightly when held next to the potential glare of corporate censorship; 
(3) As for Chairman Powell’s threats that the failure to allow consolidation 
might result in a loss of popular free, over-the-air situation comedy, the risks of 
popular revolution if Friends goes off the air are left to the reader to calculate. 
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viewpoints are presented as news, editorial, or entertainment 
programs. 
There are several problems associated with concentrated 
corporate control of news production.234 First, concentration of 
media power poses a risk of deterioration of the overall quality of 
news coverage.235 Second, consolidation risks the important role a 
private media plays as a “watchdog” of government.236 Third, a 
system of few owners of media outlets makes it easier for the 
powerful to influence them all.237 Fourth, to the extent that large 
media corporations have non-media property interests, vesting 
them with greatly disproportionate media control “creates 
opportunities and incentives to mold content to serve the firm’s 
overall corporate interests.”238 Finally, evidence from the 
deregulation of radio in the 1990s suggests that further 
consolidation in television may also result in decreased program 
originality in favor of profit-maximizing programming 
                                                          
234 Some of the factors militating against consolidation discussed herein are 
treated more comprehensively in Baker, supra note 53, 902-13. 
235 See Richmond Hearing, supra note 159, at 21 (citing evidence that past 
consolidation has led to “far less coverage of news and public interest 
programming”). Some have argued that news provided by large for-profit 
ventures has already become so dominant in society that it is mistakenly 
perceived today to be “objective.” Brenner, supra note 49, at 1029 n.119 (citing 
BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 216-18 (4th ed. 1992)). 
236 Baker, supra note 53, at 906 n.275 (discussing the benefits of dispersed 
media power in regard to the “Fourth Estate” function of the press). For a 
general discussion of this “watchdog” role of a free press, see Justice Potter 
Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 631, 634 (1975). 
237 Baker, supra note 53, at 907 (“Control or corruption is likely to be 
easier the fewer media entities [those with political or economic power] need to 
control.”). Baker also discusses the risks of external media co-option when large 
media conglomerates also have significant non-media holdings. Id. at 908. 
Powerful outside groups, both governmental and private, may then exert 
economic pressure on these non-media businesses in order to control editorial 
decisions in the broadcast divisions. Id. (giving several historical examples of 
such coercion). 
238 See Baker, supra note 53, at 909 (discussing reports that Ruport 
Murdoch promised then-president Jimmy Carter the support of Murdoch’s New 
York Post in exchange for favorable licensing decisions for an airline Murdoch 
was trying to start). 
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strategies.239 
In addition to these specific risks, it is simply a legitimate goal 
in a democratic society to disperse “the organs of public opinion 
formation” in a way that gives all groups a “real” share of 
communicative power.240 It was these concerns that motivated the 
FCC in years past to impose strong national ownership 
restrictions.241 These “organs of public opinion formation” are not 
limited to news and editorial programs. Some commentators have 
argued that even programs commonly viewed as entertainment 
carry a social message important to public debate.242 What 
                                                          
239 See Richmond Hearing, supra note 159, at 21 (citing a multi-year study 
by a group called the Future of Music Coalition which found a “homogenization 
of music that gets air play” and concluded that “radio seems to serve now more 
to advertise the products of vertically integrated conglomerates than to entertain 
Americans with the best and most original programming”). 
240 Baker, supra note 53, at 905-06 (“Dispersal of media power, like 
dispersal of voting power, is simply a key attribute of a system considered to be 
democratic.”). Id. 
241 See id. at 906; see also Fox, 280 F.3d 1027, 1034) (stating purpose of 
NTSO rule as being “to promote diversification of ownership in order to 
maximize diversification of program and service viewpoints” and “to prevent 
any undue concentration of economic power”). 
242 See Fiss, supra note 16, at 1411 (1986). “The viewpoint of an 
organization such as CBS . . . is not confined to the announced ‘Editorial 
Message,’ but extends to the broadcast of Love Boat as well. In the ordinary 
show or commercial a view of the world is projected, which in turn tends to 
define and order our options and choices.” Id. This view is echoed by Mark 
Cooper, the Director of Research for the Consumer Federation of America. 
Cooper relates an interview with FCC Chairman Powell in which Powell 
derided the view that entertainment could have a political component. See 
COOPER, supra note 4, at 17. In that interview Chairman Powell stated that “the 
overwhelming amount of programming we watch is entertainment, and I don’t 
know what it means for the owner to have a political bias. When I’m watching 
Temptation Island, do I see little hallmarks of Rupert Murdoch?” COOPER, supra 
note 4, at 17 (citing Davidson, Paul, FCC Could Alter Rules Affecting TV, 
Telephone, Airwaves, USA Today, February 6, 2002). In response, Cooper notes 
that “[t]he decision of what is entertaining and what values are promoted in 
society is clearly embodied in the commercial decision underlying “Temptation 
Island.” It stands for the proposition that paying people money to put their 
relationships in jeopardy under a voyeuristic lens constitutes good 
programming.” COOPER, supra note 4, at 17. 
KELLERMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  1:20 PM 
940 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
broadcast deregulation offers is the concentration of this power to 
convey ideas and opinions, to “select, to edit, and to choose the 
methods, manner and emphasis of presentation,” into a smaller 
group of large media conglomerates.243 The FCC’s decision to 
deregulate, therefore, indirectly places a large portion of the public 
marketplace of ideas into the hands of corporate entities whose 
primary interest in providing profitable popular entertainment is far 
removed from those interests identified by the Supreme Court as 
important to a democratic society.244 Under their control, a 
narrowing range of public discourse is likely to result.245 John 
Stuart Mill, discussing the importance of debate in a free society, 
noted: 
Unless opinions favorable to democracy and to aristocracy, 
to property and to equality, to co-operation and to 
competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality and 
individuality, to liberty and discipline, and all the other 
standing antagonisms of practical life, are expressed with 
equal freedom and enforced and defended with equal talent 
and energy, there is no chance of both elements obtaining 
their due; one scale is sure to go up, and the other down.246 
                                                          
243 FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 785 (1978) 
(listing some of the powers attendant upon ownership of television stations). 
244 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (citing relevant Supreme 
Court cases). 
245 COOPER, supra note 4, at 21. Cooper discusses the ability of the free 
market to provide popular entertainment relative to its ability to provide 
viewpoint diversity. Id. While the marketplace is “splendid” for providing goods 
and services such as entertainment, it fails to produce “the kind of debate that 
constantly renews the capacity of a people for self-determination.” Id. (citing 
Owen M. Fiss, Essays Commemorating the One Hundredth Anniversary of the 
Harvard Law Review: Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987)). The 
FCC’s current position elevates the kind of entertainment provided under a 
marketplace model of regulation over the “[u]nique perspectives provided by 
different institutions.” Id. at 20. It caters to the public’s demand for 
entertainment rather than “the net increase in consumer welfare from having 
many competing news sources and editorial voices.” Id. (citing Maurice E. 
Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69 
ANTITRUST L.J. 249 n.140 (2001)). 
246 See Mill, supra note 1, at 45-46. 
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It would be absurd to suggest either that contemporary views 
on these “standing antagonisms of practical life” are not formed, at 
least in part, by what we watch on television or that the views of 
the broadcasters who decide what we see (and what we do not) on 
television are not a factor which bears upon what they choose to 
broadcast.247 These two realities alone advise an extraordinary 
degree of caution in governmental decisions on which institutions 
should hold the power of the mass media.248 
Finally, the FCC’s assurances that these threats to viewpoint 
diversity are irrational because of the “abundance” of voices 
populating today’s media marketplace are misleading.249 
Dissenting from the June 2 vote, FCC Commissioner Copps 
pointed out that an increase in the raw number of channels does not 
serve the end of viewpoint diversity if the most widely-used of 
these new channels are owned and programmed by the same 
handful of owners who currently dominate broadcasting.250 
                                                          
247 See COOPER, supra note 4, at 17-18 (citing examples of broadcaster 
exclusion of certain disfavored political viewpoints from their broadcasts). 
248 See the 2003 Order, supra note 3, at 46,319 ¶ 281. This point takes its 
significance from the fact that television is the primary source by which most 
Americans obtain their news on current issues. Id. Viewpoint diversity would be 
much easier to come by if diverse speakers had equal access to the public’s 
attention. See also Fiss, supra note 16, at 1410-1413 (discussing the differences 
between the modern, mass-media-dominated marketplace of ideas, and that of 
the past, where virtually every speaker could gain access to a public forum). 
249 The FCC used the argument that increasing broadcast capacity renders 
the scarcity doctrine obsolete both to repudiate the fairness doctrine in 1985, see 
supra note 99, and to justify the June 2 deregulation, see supra note 164. The 
Supreme Court, however, has yet to repudiate the doctrine. See supra note 206. 
250 See Copps statement, supra note 200, at 3. Commenting on the 
majority’s argument that the scarcity rationale was rendered obsolete by the 
arrival of cable and the internet, Copps stated: 
What about the vaunted 500-channel universe of cable TV saving us? 
Well, 90 percent of the top cable channels are owned by the same 
giants that own the TV networks and the cable systems. More channels 
are great. But when they’re all owned by the same people, cable 
doesn’t protect localism, editorial diversity, or competition. And those 
who believe the Internet alone will save us from this fate should realize 
that the dominating Internet news sources are controlled by the same 
media giants who control radio, TV, newspapers, and cable. So, how 
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2.  There Has Not Been Sufficient Preparation for Dealing with the 
Risks Involved 
The foregoing arguments show that there are both benefits to 
be realized and potential dangers to be avoided in a deregulated 
media industry. Even if the FCC’s elevation of entertainment over 
diversity did not misjudge the hierarchy of interests appropriate in 
a democracy, it would be foolish policy to plunge into deregulation 
without establishing at least minimal safeguards of viewpoint 
diversity. Several of the dangers mentioned above relate to 
possible deleterious effects of consolidation on the role of the 
media in investigative journalism.251 A large media company with 
an investigative reporting division relatively free from corporate 
control may pose less of a risk to this function. This independence 
might be granted by the corporation in exchange for a preference 
from the FCC in licensing decisions.252 Of course, the funding for 
any such investigative division would have to be either 
continuously supplied by the parent corporation or subsidized by 
the government. Investigative reporters will not investigate too 
hard if what they find will result in the loss of their jobs or even a 
reduction in their salaries.253 The government might use the 
                                                          
does it promote localism, diversity and competition to allow, as we will 
allow by our action today, more media concentration in the more than 
175 markets with over 90 percent of the American population? 
Id. 
251 See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text. 
252 See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 93, at 217-18 (discussing the FCC 
licensing practice in the past of considering to what extent management of a 
television station will be directly supervised by its owners). Whereas the FCC 
used to look at centralized control by ownership as an indicator of viewpoint 
diversity, the changed circumstances of media ownership today might require 
the opposite; viewpoint diversity might be best advanced by requiring station 
owners (frequently large national and international corporations) to let local 
station management retain editorial control of the station. 
253 The effects of the ability to terminate or otherwise determine 
compensation on the performance of one’s job are almost too obvious to need 
citation. See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) 
(noting that “it is quite evident that one who holds his office only during the 
pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of 
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revenue supplied by spectrum license auctions to subsidize these 
functions (or to fund independent, non-commercial, non-
governmental investigative journalism entities).254 Until these or 
other preventative measures have been discussed and provided for, 
however, there is no compelling reason to risk these dangers. 
E.  The Next Step 
It seems clear that the FCC’s refusal to exercise its broad 
discretion to maintain broadcast ownership rules can be traced to a 
laissez-faire perspective among a majority of the Commission. 
Commissioner Abernathy, in her statement explaining her decision 
to support the deregulatory June 2 decision, gave other reasons for 
her refusal to support the existing regulations.255 She stated that, 
while she recognized that those opposing deregulation had valid 
arguments,256 she was unwilling to oppose deregulation based on 
unsubstantiated “fears” that dangerous levels of media 
consolidation would result.257 This low valuation of the threat to 
viewpoint diversity posed by consolidation is consistent with the 
view that regulation of broadcast ownership should be placed to a 
                                                          
independence against the latter’s will”); Mill, supra note 1, at 31 (“[M]en might 
as well be imprisoned as excluded from the means of earning their bread.”). 
254 See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 78, at 242-44 (discussing spectrum 
auctions as a means of awarding broadcast licences in a deregulated media 
environment); COOPER, supra note 4, at 19 (including “government subsidized 
noncommercial media” [i.e. public broadcasting] in a suggested system of 
diverse media organizations). 
255 See Statement of Commissioner Kathleen Q. Abernathy (June 2, 2003), 
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-127A4.doc. 
256 Id. at 4 (stating that “we should recognize that these are in fact issues on 
which reasonable people may disagree,” referring to differing viewpoints on 
what level of regulation is required). 
257 Id. Commissioner Abernathy boldly asserted that “[the FCC’s] decisions 
were based on facts rather than fears,” and that she was not very concerned of 
the deleterious effects of deregulation on viewpoint diversity because, “it is 
simply not possible to monopolize the flow of information in today’s world. 
Indeed, the fall of Communism in the 1980’s and of military dictatorships in the 
1990’s shows that diverse viewpoints cannot be suppressed even by 
authoritarian governments, much less by private media companies.” Id. 
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large extent in the hands of a free market.258 
But limiting government involvement in broadcast regulation 
to merely preventing levels of concentration that violate antitrust 
concerns will not provide the level of viewpoint diversity to which 
the public is entitled. Therefore, because Commissioner 
Abernathy’s priorities currently govern the FCC’s thinking, redress 
of any concerns over the threat deregulation poses must be sought 
elsewhere. 
It is possible for citizens to petition Congress, and indeed, 
congressional opposition to the June 2 vote was motivated at least 
in part by the unprecedented outcry from the public.259 The latest 
developments, however, seem to indicate that Congress will 
largely fail in its resolve to fully reverse the new FCC rules.260 
Nevertheless, the public may yet find redress in the courts. In 
upholding the Local Ownership Order against a challenge on First 
                                                          
258 See supra Part I.E-F (discussing the law and economics school and its 
effects over the past twenty years on broadcast regulation). Whether because of 
an unbounded faith in the free market (like former FCC Commissioner Fowler), 
supra note 30, or because of the lack of definitive proof of harms likely to flow 
from media consolidation (like current Commissioner Abernathy), it is evident 
that some people will not be convinced of the dangers of media consolidation 
until such consolidation occurs and harms therefrom are present in our everyday 
lives. Such a view is unfortunate, especially from those in public service, in light 
of the recognized difficulty in undoing consolidation once it has occurred. See 
Richmond Hearing, supra note 159, at 37. “Further media consolidation can’t 
easily be undone. Once the toothpaste is out of the tube, it’s going to be difficult, 
if not impossible to put it back in.” Id. 
259 See Paul Davidson, FCC Media Rule Changes Still in Flux, USA 
TODAY, June 2, 2003, at 1B (“The FCC has gotten an unprecedented 500,000 or 
so comments, mostly from critics.”). 
260 See Stephen Labaton, Court Is Urged to Change Media Ownership 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at C14. Originally, Congress had attached a 
provision to one of its 2004 spending measures that set the national audience 
reach cap from the 45 percent ordered by the FCC on June 2 back to 35 percent, 
the pre-June 2 level. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. After negotiations 
with the Bush administration, however, the measure was passed allowing a 
national audience reach of 39 percent. Labaton, supra, at C14. This agreed-upon 
39 percent level is indicative of the influence the major networks wield in 
Washington; it represents the current reach of the two largest networks, CBS 
and Fox. Id. 
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Amendment grounds, the Sinclair court found itself bound by the 
Supreme Court’s recognition in NCCB that FCC ownership rules 
“significantly further the First Amendment interest in a robust 
exchange of viewpoints.”261 While the Supreme Court has thus far 
fallen short of establishing an affirmative duty under the First 
Amendment requiring government to prevent the decay of 
viewpoint diversity in broadcast media,262 the Court continues to 
provide a forum of last resort for those seeking to vindicate the 
public’s interest in viewpoint diversity. The Fox decision, in 
acknowledging that the arguments of intervenors on behalf of the 
FCC formed part of the court’s decision to remand the NTSO rule 
rather than vacate it, suggests that citizen participation in lawsuits 
of this type can make a difference.263 
CONCLUSION 
Since its establishment in 1934, the FCC has held a great deal 
of power to manage the airwaves in the interests of the American 
public. Nothing in the recent D.C. Court of Appeals decisions in 
Fox and Sinclair removed any of this power. Nevertheless, a 
deregulatory-minded FCC used these decisions as something of a 
judicial scapegoat to hook its laissez-faire political agenda to. At 
                                                          
261 Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 168 (2002). See 
supra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing the recognition in Fox and 
Sinclair that the scarcity doctrine is alive and well). 
262 Although an affirmative duty to provide some minimum level of 
viewpoint diversity has never been raised by the Supreme Court, it has been 
discussed in legal scholarship. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social 
Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986). Fiss argues that the growing influence 
of the dominant economic actors in society on public debate might become 
destructive to the public’s interest in rich public debate. Id. at 1410. In that 
event, Fiss contends, the First Amendment might require the Supreme Court “to 
do all that it can possibly do to support and encourage the state in efforts to 
enrich public debate. . .if need be, even to require the state to continue and 
embark on programs that enrich debate.” Id. at 1424. 
263 See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1052-53 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002) (citing intervenors’ arguments in favor of maintaining the NTSO rule 
as one of the reasons for not vacating the rule); see supra note 139 and 
accompanying text. 
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most, Fox and Sinclair represent the view of one United States 
Court of Appeals that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 holds 
the FCC to a higher standard of justification for their rules. But the 
cases do not reflect, as the FCC suggests, an outright reduction of 
the broad authority the FCC has traditionally held to protect 
important public interests such as viewpoint diversity in broadcast 
TV regulation. By elevating entertainment over information 
dissemination, the new rules unwisely put the public interest at risk 
in exchange for benefits that are speculative and, even were they 
certain, not worth the likely harms to our democracy. It now 
remains for citizens, individually and collectively in civic 
organizations, to remind the FCC of its seemingly forgotten duty to 
promulgate rules that protect our society’s requirement of broad, 
robust, and antagonistic public debate. This admittedly amorphous 
but nonetheless essential characteristic of our democracy should 
not be further sacrificed in the name of corporate media’s profits. 
If necessary, Friends should be sacrificed first. 
 
